Balfour Declaration, 1917
The
Balfour Declaration was a
letter dated
November 2,
1917, from
British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour, to
Lord Rothschild (Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild), a leader of the
British Jewish
community, for transmission to the
Zionist Federation, a private
Zionist organization. The letter stated the position, agreed at a
British Cabinet meeting on
October 31 1917, that the
British government supported
Zionist plans for a
Jewish "national home" in
Palestine, with the condition that nothing should be done which might prejudice the
rights of existing communities there. It is also interesting to note that during this period
Joseph Stalin set up the
Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Asiatic Russia, which still exists today.
By the standards of international diplomacy, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 is an amazing document, succinctly summarized by
Arthur Koestler who wrote that the declaration amounted to "one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third." Beyond the textual content of the Balfour Declaration - it was made up of just three sentences and some 125 words in total - its significance lies in how it came to pass and what impact it had both on the course of
World War I and subsequent events culminating in the formation of Israel.
Perhaps the Balfour Declaration can best be appreciated as part of the increasing escalation, both military and political, between the
Allies and
Central Powers over the course of late-1916 and 1917. By late 1916, the Central Powers, especially Germany, were suffering mightily from the deprivations caused by the Allied blockade. In February of 1917, Germany - in response to this blockade - initiated its own counter-blockade of Britain and attempted to enforce it by a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.
A month later,
Tsar Nicholas II abdicated signaling the eventual withdrawal of Russia as an effective adversary to Germany and Austria-Hungary. From the perspective of the Triple Entente, the potential consequences unfolding in Russia were grave. Beyond the loss of a powerful counterforce on Germany's eastern flank, a defeated or neutral Russia offered the Central Powers the possibility of evading the Allied blockade by importing foodstuffs and war material directly from Russia.
Although the United States had voted to enter the war in April of 1917, it was not projected to deliver troops in numbers on the continent until Summer of the following year. Additionally the effects on Britain of U-boat sinkings were significant and growing, ramping up to an average of over 500,000 tons per month during the Summer of 1917. After three years of continuous slaughter and with the specter of German troops, freed from assignments in Russia, soon arriving on the Western Front, Britain found herself in a somewhat desperate situation by the Autumn of 1917. A very real question at this time for the Entente leadership was whether the arrival of the Americans would be in time to stave off an Allied defeat.
The war, in a grisly virtual stalemate at this point in time, found both Germany and Britain actively making overtures to the Zionist Movement in order to enlist the resources of this group in assisting their cause. Both sides were well aware of the significant Zionist influence within Bolshevik Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. Further, Britain recognized that the natural sentiment of many European Jews was, in fact, with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Following the logic that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" European Jews tended to view the Central Powers favorably given their role in defeating the overtly anti-Semitic Tsarist government in Russia. Well aware of this sentiment, Imperial Germany during this same period was actively courting the Zionist movement, both domestically and internationally, but was circumscribed in this effort by the fact that Palestine was then a component of the Ottoman Empire â€" a key ally of Germany within the Central Powers.
By the Summer of 1917, the world had been at war for three years. All major belligerents were facing the common issues of unbelievable casualty levels, the deprivations of an increasingly effective blockade, dwindling financial resources and the unthinkable specter of actually losing this war. No tactic or strategy was beyond consideration if it offered a reasonable chance to gain advantage over the other side.
At the same time the Zionist movement was very active in all forms of negotiations to convince one or more of the major powers to support the goals of the Zionist movement - namely support for Jewish migration to Palestine. Active negotiations were going on in Constantinople, Berlin, Paris, London, New York and Washington. As events turned out, Zionist efforts first proved successful in London.
In December of 1916, the leaders of the British government, locked in a power struggle, resigned and King George V requested a new government be formed. Both the incoming Prime Minster,
David Lloyd-George, and the new Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour, were sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Before the war, Lloyd George had served as legal counsel to the Zionists and was familiar with Chaim Weizmann in his previous role as Minister of Munitions. Immediately Zionist efforts focused on London and the British government. Over the course of 1917 there ensued within the British government a protracted and fierce debate involving both Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews over if and how the British government would formally support the Zionist cause.
The anti-Zionists were led by Secretary of State for India Edwin Montagu who viewed support for Zionism, by non-Jews, as a form of antisemitism because it would relocate the center of Jewish life to Palestine and therefore away from the various European and American capitals. There were also fears amongst this group that formal support for Zionism, during the war, could trigger increased anti-semitic activities, specifically within the Ottoman Empire, thereby placing Turkish Jews in harm's way. This debate raged on through the Summer and Autumn of 1917, eventually including members of the American Zionist movement and government, with the pro-Zionists eventually winning the day.
Given this context then, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 can be seen as an effective tool for Britain to serve multiple ends. Seen through British eyes and from the perspective of late 1917, it would serve as a powerful propaganda tool aimed at the world's Jewish community in hopes of securing additional financial support â€" cash contributions, loans, grants - to fill the depleted coffers of the Allied governments. Secondly, it would effectively preempt Germany's ongoing efforts to enlist both informal and formal support from the Zionist movement. In a very real sense whichever side issued such a declaration first would effectively preclude any positive impact of the other side's efforts.
With Russia less than a month away from signing an armistice with Germany, it also delivered a targeted message to the Russian Bolsheviks. At this point in the revolution, the Bolsheviks as a group were, if not predominantly, then by a significant plurality, of Jewish extraction. The message of the Balfour Declaration then, to this group, was that support of Germany, post-armistice, would work directly against the goals of the Zionist cause â€" as outlined in the Balfour Declaration. Through this tactic, Britain aimed to keep Germany and a newly-Bolshevik Russia at arm's length in hope of denying Russian trade and resources to Germany and keeping a maximum number of German troops tied down in the East (and therefore not available for deployment on the Western Front).
Finally, the messages within the Balfour Declaration could not help but sow seeds of doubts within the minds of those ruling the
Central Powers as to where the loyalty of their own domestic Jewish populations lay. For the Jews of
Austria-Hungary, Germany and the
Ottoman Empire, the Balfour Declaration put at direct odds their loyalty to state against any Zionist sentiments that they may have harbored.
From a historical perspective, a fascinating "what-if" of the Twentieth Century concerns the hypothetical of Imperial Germany issuing its own version of the Balfour Declaration in October or November of 1917, prior to the December 2nd issuance by Britain. Were the Imperial German Foreign Office able to reconcile the Turkish side of this issue and make such a declaration, the impacts of such an event could have significantly re-written the history of the latter half of the last century.
The realities of managing the Ottoman Empire's participation within the Central Powers effectively prevented this from happening, however. At the time, most of the area of Palestine was still under the control of the Ottoman Empire, greatly limiting Germany's ability to court Zionist leaders. Skipping ahead for a moment, it is interesting to note that the borders of what would become Palestine had been outlined as part of the May 16, 1916, Sykes-Picot Agreement secretly concluded between Britain and France over the eighteen months prior to the Balfour Declaration.
Language from the Declaration was later incorporated into the
Sèvres peace treaty with
Turkey and the
Mandate for Palestine. The declaration, a typed letter signed in ink by Balfour, reads as follows:
Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917
Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours sincerely,Arthur James Balfour
The record of discussions that led up to the final text of the Balfour Declaration clarifies some details of its wording. The phrase "national home" was intentionally used instead of "state", and the British devoted some effort over the following decades to denying that a state was the intention, including the
Churchill White Paper, 1922. However, in private, many British officials agreed with the interpretation of the Zionists that a state would be the eventual outcome.
An early draft used the word
that in referring to Palestine as a Jewish homeland, which was changed to
in Palestine to avoid committing to it being the whole of Palestine. Similarly, an early draft did not include the commitment to not prejudicing the rights of the non-Jewish communities. These changes came about partly as the result of the urgings of
Edwin Samuel Montagu, an influential anti-Zionist Jew and
Secretary of State for India, who, among others, was concerned that the declaration without those changes could result in increased anti-Semitic persecution.
Like the preceding
Sykes-Picot Agreement, the declaration is viewed as a gross betrayal of Britain's undertakings to support Arab independence in the
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of
1915–
1916.
One of the main Jewish figures who negotiated the granting of the declaration was Dr.
Chaim Weizmann, the leading spokesman for organized Zionism in Britain. During the first meeting between Chaim Weizmann and Balfour, in
1906, the Unionist leader was impressed by Weizman's personality. Balfour asked Weizmann why Palestine—and Palestine alone—could be the basis for Zionism. "Anything else would be idolatry", Weizmann protested, adding: "Mr. Balfour, supposing I were to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?" "But Dr. Weizmann", Balfour retorted, "we have London", to which Weizmann rejoined, "That is true, but we had Jerusalem when London was a marsh."
[B. Dugdale (1939): "Arthur James Balfour", Vol I, p. 326 & 327]Weizmann was a chemist who managed to synthesize
acetone via
fermentation. Acetone is needed in the production of
cordite, a powerful propellant explosive needed to fire ammunition without generating tell-tale smoke. Germany had cornered supplies of a major source of acetone,
calcium acetate and other pre-war processes in Britain were inadequate to meet the increased demand in the
Great War. A shortage of cordite would have severely hampered Britain's war effort. The Minister for Munitions
David Lloyd-George, who became Prime Minister shortly after, was grateful to Weizmann and also supported him. Balfour asked what payment he would in return for the use of his process, Weizmann responded, "There is only one thing I want. A national home for my people." He eventually received both payment for his discovery and a role in the history of the origins of the state of Israel.
It has been reported that Balfour's Jewish sympathies were influenced by an illicit relationship with the wife of a high-ranking Jewish official.
[Margaret MacMillan "Paris 1919 : Six Months That Changed the World"]In his November, 2002 interview with the
New Statesman magazine, the
UK Foreign Secretary,
Jack Straw, has blamed Britain's imperial past for many of the modern political problems, including the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
[British Empire blamed for modern conflicts Jack Straw said serious mistakes had been made (BBC) 5 November, 2002] "The Balfour declaration and the contradictory assurances which were being given to Palestinians in private at the same time as they were being given to the Israelis—again, an interesting history for us, but not an honourable one," he said.
*
1922 Text: League of Nations Palestine Mandate*
1947 UN Partition Plan*
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel,
May 14 1948*
Madagascar Plan*
British Uganda Program*
text of the 1922 White Paper from the Avalon Project
* Donald Macintyre, The Independent,
26 May 2005,
"The birth of modern Israel: A scrap of paper that changed history"
