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The Battle of Warsaw (sometimes referred to as the Miracle at the Vistula, Polish: Cud nad Wisłą) was the decisive battle of the Polish-Soviet War, which began soon after the end of World War I in 1918 and lasting until the Treaty of Riga (1921). The Battle of Warsaw was fought from 13 to 25 August 1920 as Red Army forces commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevski approached the Polish capital of Warsaw and nearby Modlin Fortress. On August 16 Polish, forces commanded by Józef Piłsudski counter-attacked from the south, forcing the Russian forces into a disorganised withdrawal eastward and behind the Niemen River. Estimated Bolshevik losses were 10,000 killed, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 66,000 taken prisoner, compared with Polish losses of some 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing and 22,000 wounded. Before the Polish victory at the Vistula, both the Bolsheviks and the majority of foreign experts considered Poland to be on the verge of defeat. The stunning, unexpected Polish victory crippled the Bolshevik forces. In the following months, several more Polish victories secured Poland's independence and eastern borders. The battlePrelude to the battleThe Poles were fighting to preserve their newly regained independence, lost in the 1795 third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and to carve out the borders of a new multinational federation (Międzymorze) from the territories of their former partitioners, Russia, Germany and the Austria-Hungary.The Bolsheviks had in 1919 gained the upper hand in the Russian Civil War, having dealt crippling blows to the White Russians. Vladimir Lenin viewed Poland as a bridge that had to be crossed so that communism could be brought to Central and Western Europe, and the Polish-Bolshevik War seemed the perfect way to test Bolshevik strength. Bolshevik speeches asserted that the revolution was to be carried to western Europe on the bayonets of Soviet soldats and that the shortest route to Berlin and Paris lay through Warsaw. After early setbacks against Poland in 1919, the Bolshevik offensive that began in early 1920 had been overwhelmingly successful and by mid-1920, the entire world expected Poland to collapse at any moment. The Soviet strategy called for a massed push toward the Polish capital, Warsaw. Its capture would have had a tremendous propaganda effect for the Soviets, who expected it not only to undermine the morale of the Poles, but to spark an international series of communist uprisings and clear the way for the Red Army to join the German Revolution.
The battle planPolish planBy the beginning of August, the Polish retreat had become more organized. At first, Józef Piłsudski wanted to base his operation on the Bug River and Brest-Litovsk, but their unexpected fall made it impossible. On the night of August 5"6, Piłsudski conceived a revised plan at the Belweder Palace in Warsaw. It called for Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and defend the bridgeheads at Warsaw and at the Wieprz River. Some 25% of the available divisions would be concentrated to the south for a strategic counteroffensive.
The most important role, however, was assigned to a relatively small (some 20,000-man), newly assembled "Reserve Army" (also called the "Assault Group" - Grupa Uderzeniowa), commanded personally by Józef Piłsudski, comprising the most battle-hardened and determined Polish units drawn from the southern front. They were to be reinforced by General Leonard Skierski's 4th Army and General Zygmunt Zieliński's 3rd Army, which, after retreating from the Western Bug River area, had moved not directly toward Warsaw but had crossed the Wieprz River and broken off contact with their pursuers. The Assault Group's assignment was to spearhead a lightning northern offensive from the Vistula-Wieprz River triangle south of Warsaw, through a weak spot identified by Polish intelligence between the Soviet Western and Southwestern Fronts. This would separate the Soviet Western Front from its reserves and disorganize its movements. Eventually the gap between Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army and the advancing Assault Group would close near the East Prussian border, leaving the Soviet offensive "trapped in a sack." Although based on fairly reliable information provided by Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio communications, the plan was labelled as 'amateurish' by many high-ranking army officers and military experts, who were quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of formal military education. Many Polish units, a mere week before the planned date of the counter-attack, were fighting in places as far as 100-150 miles (150 to 250 km) from the concentration points. All of the troop movements were within striking distance of the Red Army. One strong push by the Red Army could derail plans for a Polish counter-attack and endanger the cohesion of the whole Polish front. Piłsudski's plan was strongly criticized by Polish commanders and officers of the French Military Mission. Even Piłsudski himself admitted in his memoirs that it was a very risky gamble and the reasons he decided to go forward with the plan were the defeatist mood of politicians, fear for the safety of the capital and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost. Only the desperate situation persuaded other army commanders to go along with it, as they realized that under such circumstances it was the only possible way to avoid a devastating defeat. Ironically, when a copy of the plan "accidentally" fell into Soviet hands it was considered to be a poor deception attempt and ignored. A few days later, the Soviets paid dearly for this mistake.
Bolshevik planMikhail Tukhachevski planned to encircle and surround Warsaw by crossing the Vistula river, near Włocławek to the north and south of the city and launch an attack from the northwest. With his 24 divisions, he planned to repeat the classic maneuvre of Ivan Paskievich, who in 1831, during the November Uprising, had crossed the Vistula at Toruń and reached Warsaw practically unopposed. This move would also cut the Polish forces off from Gdańsk, the only port open to shipments of arms and supplies.The main weakness of the Soviet plan was the poorly defended southern flank, secured only by the Pinsk Marshes and the weak Mozyr Group; the majority of the Soviet Southwest Front was engaged in the battle of Lwów. First phase, August 12Meanwhile Bolsheviks pushed forward. Gay Dimitrievich Gay's Cavalry Corps together with the 4th Army crossed Wkra river and advanced towards the town of Włocławek. The 15th and 3rd Armies were approaching Modlin fortress and the 16th Army moved towards Warsaw.The final Soviet assault on Warsaw began on August 12 with the Soviet 16th Army the attack at the town of Radzymin (only 23 kilometres east of the city). Its initial success prompted Piłsudski to move up his plans by 24 hours.
The situation was saved around midnight when the 203rd Uhlan Regiment managed to break through the Bolshevik lines and destroy the radio station of A.D. Shuvayev's Soviet 4th Army. The latter unit had only one remaining radio station fixed on one frequency which was known to the Polish intelligence. Since the Polish code-breakers did not want the Bolsheviks to find out that their codes were broken, but still neutralize the other radio station, the radio station in Warsaw recited the book of Genesis in Polish and Latin on the frequency used by the 4th Army, which thus lost contact with its headquarters and continued marching toward Toruń and Płock, unaware of Tukhachevski's order to turn south. The raid by the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to as the Miracle of Ciechanów. At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under Gen. Franciszek Latinik resisted a Red Army direct assault on Warsaw by six rifle divisions. The struggle for control of Radzymin forced Gen. Józef Haller, commander of the Polish Northern Front, to start the 5th Army's counterattack earlier than planned. During this time, Piłsudski was finishing his plans for the counter-offensive. He decided to personally supervise the attack and, because of the enormous risks involved, he handed in a letter with his resignation from all state functions. Thereafter, between August 13 and 15, he visited all units of the 4th Army concentrating near Puławy, about 100 kilometres south of Warsaw. He tried to raise morale, since many soldiers were tired and demoralized and numerous recently incorporated replacements showed everyone the extent of Polish losses. Logistics were a nightmare, as the Polish army was equipped with guns made in five countries and rifles manufactured in six, each of them using different ammunition. Adding to the problem was the fact that the equipment was in poor shape. Piłsudski remembers: "In 21 Division, almost half of the soldiers paraded in front of me barefoot." Nevertheless, in only three days, Piłsudski was able to raise the morale of his troops and motivate them for one of their greatest efforts. Second phase, August 14The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to reach the village of Izabelin, 13 kilometres from the capital, but this was the closest that Russian forces would come. Soon the tides of battle would change.
From that moment on, Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army pushed exhausted Soviet units away from Warsaw, in an almost blitzkrieg-like operation. Sikorski's units, supported by the majority of the small number of Polish tanks, armoured cars and artillery of the two armoured trains, advanced at the speed of 30 kilometres a day, soon destroying any Soviet hopes for completing their "enveloping" manoeuvre in the north. Third phase, August 16On August 16, the Polish Reserve Army commanded by Józef Piłsudski began its march north from the Wieprz River. It faced the Mozyr Group, a Soviet corps that had defeated the Poles during the Kyiv operation several months earlier. However, during its pursuit of the retreating Polish armies, the Mozyr Group had lost most of its forces and been reduced to a mere two divisions covering a 150-kilometre front-line on the left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On the first day of the counter-offensive, only one of the five Polish divisions reported any sort of opposition, while the remaining four, supported by a cavalry brigade, managed to push north 45 kilometres unopposed. When evening fell, the town of Włodawa had been liberated, and the communication and supply lines of the Soviet 16th Army had been cut. Even Piłsudski was surprised by the extent of these early successes. Reserve Army units covered about 70 kilometres in 36 hours, splitting the Soviet offensive and meeting virtually no resistance. The Mozyr Group consisted solely of the 57th Infantry Division, which had been beaten in the first day of the operation. Consequently, the Polish armies found a huge gap between the Russian fronts and exploited it, continuing their northward offensive with two armies following and falling on the surprised and confused enemy.On August 18, Mikhail Tukhachevski, in his headquarters in Minsk some 300 miles east of Warsaw, became fully aware of the extent of his defeat and ordered the remnants of his forces to retreat and regroup. His intention was to straighten the front line, stop the Polish attack and to regain the initiative, but the orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all. Soviet General Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps continued to advance toward Pomerania, its lines endangered by the Polish 5th Army, which had finally managed to push back the Bolshevik armies and gone over in pursuit. The Polish 1st Division of the Legion, in order to cut the enemy's retreat, made a remarkable march from Lubartów to Białystok - 163 miles in 6 days. The soldiers fought in two battles, slept only a few hours and marched for up to 21 hours a day. Their sacrifice and endurance was rewarded when the entire 16th Soviet Army was cut off at Białystok and most of its troops taken prisoner. The Soviet armies in the center of the front fell into chaos. Some divisions continued to fight their way toward Warsaw, while others turned to retreat, lost their cohesion and panicked. The Russian commander-in-chief lost contact with most of his forces, and all Soviet plans were thrown into disorder. Only the 15th Army remained an organised force and tried to obey Tukhachevski's orders, shielding the withdrawal of the westernmost extended 4th Army. But it was defeated twice on August 19th and 20th and joined the general rout of the Red Army's North-Western Front. Tukhachevski had no choice but to order a full retreat toward the Western Bug River. By August 21st, all organized resistance ceased to exist and by August 31, the Soviet South-Western Front was completely routed. AftermathAlthough Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians, Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not succeed completely. Four Soviet armies began to march toward Warsaw on July 4th in the framework of the North-Western Front. By the end of August, the 4th and 15th Armies were defeated in the field, their remnants crossed the Prussian border and were disarmed. Nevertheless, these troops were soon released and fought against Poland again. The 3rd Army retreated east so quickly that Polish troops could not catch up with them; consequently, this army sustained the fewest losses. The 16th Army disintegrated at Białystok and most of its soldiers became prisoners of war. The majority of Gay's 3rd Cavalry Corps were forced across the German border and were interned in East Prussia.
The southern arm of the Red Army's forces had been routed and no longer posed a threat to the Poles. Semyon Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army besieging Lwów had been defeated at the Battle of Komarów (August 31, 1920) and the Battle of Hrubieszów. By mid-October, the Polish Army had reached the Tarnopol-Dubno-Minsk-Drisa line. Tukhachevski managed to reorganize the eastward-retreating forces and in September established a new defensive line near Grodno. In order to break it, the Polish Army had to fight the Battle of the Niemen River (September 15-September 21), once again defeating the Bolshevik armies. After the Battle of the Szczara River, both sides were exhausted and on October 12, under heavy pressure from France and Britain, a cease-fire was signed. By October 18, the fighting was over, and on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga was signed, ending hostilities. Soviet propaganda before the Battle of Warsaw had described the fall of Poland's capital as imminent, and the anticipated fall of Warsaw was to be a signal for the start of a large-scale communist revolutions in Poland, Germany and other European countries, economically devastated by the First World War. The Soviet defeat was thus a setback for some Soviet officials (including Vladimir Lenin). A National Democrat Sejm deputy, Stanisław Stroński, coined the phrase, "Miracle at the Wisła" (Polish: "Cud nad Wisłą"), to underline his disapproval of Piłsudski's "Ukrainian adventure." Stroński's phrase was adopted with approval by some patriotically- or piously-minded Poles unaware of Stroński's ironic intent. Breaking of Soviet ciphersAccording to documents found in 2005 at Poland's Central Military Archives, Polish cryptologists broke intercepted Russian ciphers as early as September 1919. At least some of the Polish victories, not only the Battle of Warsaw but throughout the campaign, are attributable to this. Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski, credited with the original breakthrough, received the order of Virtuti Militari in 1921.Orders of battlePolish
* Northern Front: 250 km., from East Prussia, along the Vistula River, to Modlin: ** 5th Army ** 1st Army - Warsaw ** 2nd Army - Warsaw * Central Front: ** 4th Army - between Dęblin and Kock ** 3rd Army - between south of Kock and Brody * Southern Front - between Brody and the Dniestr River Soviet
See also* Battle of Warsaw (1939)* Blue Army NotesReferences* Edgar Vincent D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World: Warsaw, 1920, Hyperion Press, 1977, ISBN 0883554291.* Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, Pimlico, 2003, ISBN 0712606947. * J.F.C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Hunter Publishing, ISBN 0586080368. * Jeremy Keenan, The Pole: the Heroic Life of Jozef Pilsudski, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 2004, ISBN 0715632108. * Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate, 1918-1939, Hippocrene Books, 1998, ISBN 0781806739. * M. Tarczyński, Cud nad Wisłą, Warszawa, 1990. * Józef Piłsudski, Pisma zbiorowe, Warszawa, 1937, reprinted by Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1991, ISBN 8303030590. * Mikhail Tukhachevski, Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7-10, 1923, reprinted in Pochód za Wisłę (March across the Vistula), Łódź, 1989. External links*Battle Of Warsaw 1920 by Witold Lawrynowicz; A detailed write-up, with bibliography *3 scans Polish maps * "Bolszewik złamany Gazeta Wyborcza article about breaking of Soviet ciphers.
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