Effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans
The
effect of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans was catastrophic and long-lasting. The storm, which was the
costliest hurricane as well as one of the deadliest
natural disasters in
U.S. history, made its second and third landfalls in the Gulf Coast region on
August 29,
2005 as a powerful
Category 3 hurricane. By
August 31,
2005, eighty percent (80%) of the city was flooded, with some parts under 20 feet (6.1 meters) of water. Four of the city's protective
levees were breached, including the
17th Street Canal levee, the
Industrial Canal levee, and the
London Avenue Canal floodwall.
Although more than 80% of residents evacuated, the rest remained. The
Louisiana Superdome, used as a designated "refuge of last resort" for those who remained in the city, also sustained significant damage, including two sections of the roof that were compromised, and the dome's waterproof membrane had essentially been peeled off. As the city flooded, many who remained in their homes had to swim for their lives, wade through deep water, or remain trapped in their attics or on their rooftops.
The disaster had major implications for a large segment of the
population,
economy and
politics of the entire
United States, which lasted for several months, well into 2006.
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New Orleans sits between (and below) the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain. |
Flooding due to rain and storms has long been an issue since the New Orleans' early settlement due to the city's location on a
delta marsh, much of which sits below sea level. The city is surrounded by the
Mississippi River to the south,
Lake Pontchartrain to the north, and
Lake Borgne to the east. The first settlements by the
French during colonial times in the area were above
sea level, a trend that continued until the 19th century. Construction of the levees along the River began soon after the city was founded, and more extensive river levees were built as the city grew. The levees were originally designed to prevent damage caused by seasonal flooding. Today, the modern 17th Street and London Avenue Canals are used for drainage, while the wide, navigable Industrial Canal is used for shipping. The heavy flooding caused by
Hurricane Betsy in 1965 brought concerns regarding flooding from hurricanes to the forefront.
There were many predictions of hurricane risk in New Orleans before
Hurricane Katrina in August, 2005.
[Wilson, Jim. "New Orleans is Sinking." Popular Mechanics. September 11, 2001.][Fischetti, Mark. "Drowning New Orleans." Scientific American. October, 2001.][Mooney, Chris. "Thinking Big About Hurricanes." The American Prospect. May 23, 2005.] In 2001, the
Houston Chronicle published a story which predicted that a severe hurricane striking New Orleans, "would strand 250,000 people or more, and probably kill one of 10 left behind as the city drowned under 20 feet of water. Thousands of refugees could land in Houston."
[Berger, Eric. "Keeping its head above water: New Orleans faces doomsday scenario." Houston Chronicle. December 1, 2001.] Many concerns also focused around the fact that the city's
levee system was only designed for hurricanes of no greater intensity than
category 3.
[Westerink, J.J.; Luettich, R.A. "The Creeping Storm." Civil Engineering Magazine. June, 2003.][Laska, Shirley. "What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?" Natural Hazards Observer. November 2, 2004.] As it turned out, Katrina was Category 3 when it made landfall and most of New Orleans experienced Category 1 or 2 strength winds. However, due to the slow moving nature of the storm in its pass over New Orleans, several floodwalls lining the shipping and drainage canals in New Orleans collapsed and the resulting flood water from
Lake Ponchartrain inundated the city within the two days following the storm, causing costly damage to buildings and resulting in many deaths.
Furthermore, the region's natural defenses, the surrounding
marshland and the
barrier islands, have been dwindling in recent years.
[Bourne, Joel K. "Gone with the Water." National Geographic. October, 2004.] Much of the land was undeveloped
swamp on the lake side, and only small levees were constructed in the 19th century. A much larger project to build up levees along the lake and extend the shoreline out by
dredging began in 1927. As the city grew, there was increased pressure to urbanize lower areas, and, as a result, a large system of canals and pumps was constructed to drain the city. Drainage of the formerly swampy ground allowed more room for the city to expand, but also resulted in
subsidence of the local soil.
Outside of the city, the Mississippi River's natural
deposition of suspended sediment built up the river's
delta marshlands during periodic flooding episodes. However, the lower Mississippi was later restricted to channels for the benefit of shipping, which interrupted the process that continued to build the
Mississippi Delta and prevented its erosion. As the swampy lands of Southern Louisiana shrank, the land began to sink. Entire barrier islands disappeared during periodic storms as the land of the vast delta slowly settled without river
silt to replenish the wetlands. Approximately one-third of the land subsidence has been attributed to the large number of canals through the delta. Barge traffic and tides erode the earth around the edge of the canals, and salty
Gulf water seeps in along them, slowly salinating the ground and killing the vegetation that the land previously depended on to anchor it.
The eye of Hurricane Katrina was forecast to pass to the east of New Orleans. In that event, the wind would come back from the north as the storm passed, forcing large volumes of water from
Lake Pontchartrain against the levees and possibly into the city. It was also forecast that the storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain would reach 14 to 18 feet (4 - 5 meters), with waves reaching seven feet (2 meters) above the storm surge.
On
August 28, at 10:00 AM CDT, the
National Weather Service (NWS) field office in New Orleans issued
a bulletin predicting catastrophic damage to New Orleans. Anticipated effects included, at the very least, the partial destruction of half of the well-constructed houses in the city, severe damage to most industrial buildings, rendering them inoperable, the, "total destruction," of all wood-framed low-rise apartment buildings, all windows blowing out in high-rise office buildings, and the creation of a huge debris field of trees, telephone poles, cars, and collapsed buildings.
["Urgent Weather Message." National Weather Service/New Orleans, Louisiana. August 28, 2005.] Lack of clean water was predicted to, "make human suffering incredible by modern standards".
[Whittell, Giles. "Warnings were loud and clear - but still city drowned." The Times. September 8, 2005.]It was also predicted that the standing water caused by the storm surge would render most of the city uninhabitable for weeks and that the destruction of oil and petrochemical refineries in the surrounding area would spill waste into the flooding. The resulting mess would coat every surface, converting the city into a toxic marsh until water could be drained. Some experts said that it could take six months or longer to pump all the water out of the city.
[Galle, Julie. "Special Report: Vulnerable Cities: New Orleans, LA." The Weather Channel. Accessed on April 30, 2006.]Evacuation order
In anticipation of widespread destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina, Max Mayfield, the director of the
National Hurricane Center, telephoned New Orleans
Mayor Ray Nagin on the night of
August 27 to express his extreme concern, and on the following day, made a video call to
U.S. President George W. Bush at his farm in
Crawford, Texas about the severity of the storm.
[Lush, Tamara. "For forecasting chief, no joy in being right." St. Petersburg Times. August 30, 2005.]With the hurricane threatening the Gulf Coast, many New Orleanins started taking precautions to secure their homes and prepare for possible evacuation on Friday the 26th and Saturday the 27th. By mid morning on the 27th, many local gas stations which were not yet out of gas had long lines. Nagin first called for a voluntary evacuation of the city at 5:00 PM on
August 27 and subsequently ordered a citywide mandatory evacuation at 9:30 AM on
August 28, the first such order in the city's history. In a live news conference, Mayor Nagin predicted that, "the storm surge most likely will topple our levee system," and warned that oil production in the Gulf of Mexico would be shut down. President Bush made a televised appeal for residents to heed the evacuation orders, warning, "We cannot stress enough the danger this hurricane poses to Gulf Coast communities."
[Hauser, Christine; Lueck, Thomas J. "Mandatory Evacuation Ordered for New Orleans as Storm Nears." New York Times. August 28, 2005.] Many neighboring areas and parishes also called for evacuations. By mid-afternoon, officials in
Plaquemines,
St. Bernard,
St. Charles,
Lafourche,
Terrebonne,
Jefferson,
St. Tammany, and
Washington parishes had called for voluntary or mandatory evacuations."
[Nolan, Bruce. "Katrina Takes Aim." Times-Picayune. August 28, 2005.]Although Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city, many remained voluntarily, which a CNN writer described as "gambling with their own lives."
[Staff Writer. "New Orleans braces for monster hurricane." CNN. August 29, 2005] Reasons were numerous, including feeling their homes or the buildings they planned to stay in offered sufficent protection, lack of financial resources or access to transportation, a feeling of obligation to protect their property, or fearing that the tribulations of evacuation (which many went throught the previous year with Ivan) were more of a hazard than the hurricane risk. A "refuge of last resort," was designated at the
Louisiana Superdome. Beginning at noon on
August 28 and running for several hours, city buses were redeployed to shuttle local residents from 12 pickup points throughout the city to the, "shelters of last resort."
[Olsen, Lise. "City had evacuation plan but strayed from strategy." Houston Chronicle. September 8, 2005.] Several hundred school buses were also available, yet they were not deployed, apparently because not enough drivers could be found.
By the time Hurricane Katrina came ashore early the next morning, approximately one million people had fled the city and its surrounding suburbs by the evening of
August 28, while about 20,000 to 25,000 people remained in the city, taking shelter at the
Louisiana Superdome, along with 550
National Guard troops. While supplies of
MREs and bottled water were available at the Superdome, Nagin told survivors to bring blankets and enough food for several days, warning that it would be a very uncomfortable place. As the elevation of the Superdome is about three feet (1 m) above sea level, the forecasted storm surge was predicted to cause flooding on that site. Survivors were told to keep out of the lower levels of the structure, for fear it would be flooded.
The Superdome had been used as a shelter in the past, such as during 1998's
Hurricane Georges, because it was estimated to be able to withstand winds of up to 200 mph (320 km/h) and water levels of 35 feet (10 m).
The entire southeastern Louisiana region was declared a disaster area by the Federal Government before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, and
FEMA prepositioned 18 disaster medical teams, medical supplies and equipment, urban search and rescue teams along with millions of MREs, liters of water, tarpaulins, and truckloads of ice.
Hurricane Katrina made its second and third landfalls in the Gulf Coast region on
August 29,
2005 as a
Category 3 hurricane.
[Knabb, Richard D.; Rhome, Jamie R.; Brown, Daniel P. "Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina." ''National Hurricane Center. December 20, 2005.]On Monday
August 29 area affiliates of local television station
WDSU reported New Orleans was experiencing widespread flooding due to several levee breaches, was without power, and that there were several instances of catastrophic damage in residential and business areas. By 2:00 PM, the east side of New Orleans was under 5 to 6 feet (1.5 - 1.8 meters) of water. Entire neighborhoods on the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain were flooded.
The extensive flooding stranded many residents, who remained so long after Hurricane Katrina had passed. Stranded survivors dotted the tops of houses citywide. In the
Ninth Ward, as many as 116 residents were seen on rooftops seeking aid. Many others were trapped inside attics, unable to escape.
Some people reportedly chopped their way onto their roofs with hatchets and sledge hammers, which residents had been urged to keep in their attics in case of such events since
Hurricane Betsy. Clean water was unavailable, and power outages were expected to last for weeks.
By 11:00 PM on
August 29, Mayor Nagin described the loss of life as "significant" with reports of bodies floating on the water throughout the city, though primarily in the eastern portions. There was no clean water or electricity in the city, and some hotels and hospitals reported diesel fuel shortages. The
National Guard began setting up temporary morgues in select locations. He also said many houses have been picked up and moved.
Communications failures
Coordination of rescue efforts
August 29 and
August 30 were made difficult by disruption of the communications infrastructure. Many telephones, including most cell phones, were not working due to line breaks, destruction of
base stations, or power failures, even though some base stations had their own back-up generators. In a number of cases, reporters were asked to brief public officials on the conditions in areas where information was not reaching them any other way.
All local television stations were disrupted. Local television stations, as well as newspapers, moved quickly to sister locations in nearby cities. Broadcasting and publishing on the Internet became an important means of distributing information to evacuees and the rest of the world.
Amateur radio provided tactical and emergency communications as well as health-and-welfare enquiries.
By
September 4, a temporary communications hub was set up at the Hyatt Hotel in downtown New Orleans.
Damage to buildings and roads
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An aerial view of the flooding in part of the Central Business District. The Superdome is at center. |
Most of the major roads traveling into and out of the city were damaged. The only route out of the city was
west on the Crescent City Connection as the
I-10 (twin span) bridge traveling
east towards
Slidell, Louisiana had collapsed. The 24 mile long
Lake Pontchartrain Causeway escaped unscathed but was only carrying emergency traffic.
Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport was closed before the storm but thankfully reported no flooding in airplane movement area's or inside of the building itself. By
August 30, it was reopened to humanitarian and rescue operations. Commercial
cargo flights resumed on
September 10, and commercial passenger service resumed on
September 13.
On
August 29, at 7:40 AM CDT, it was reported that most of the windows on the north side of the Hyatt Regency New Orleans had been blown out, and many other high rise buildings had extensive window damage.
[Transcript from, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. "Hurricane Damages Gulf Coast." PBS. August 29, 2005.] The Hyatt was the most severely damaged hotel in the city, with beds reported to be flying out of the windows. Insulation tubes were exposed as the hotel's glass exterior was completely sheared off.
The Superdome sustained significant damage, including two sections of the roof that were compromised, and the dome's waterproof membrane had essentially been peeled off. On
August 30, Louisiana governor
Kathleen Blanco ordered the complete evacuation of the remaining people that sought shelter in the
Superdome.
[Rourke, Matt. "New Orleans outlook bleak; 100 dead in Miss." USA Today. August 30, 2005.] They were then transported to the
Astrodome in
Houston, Texas.
Levee failures
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Flooded I-10 interchage and surrounding area of northwest New Orleans and Metairie, Louisiana |
As of mid-day Monday,
August 29, the eye of Hurricane Katrina had swept northeast. It subjected the city to hurricane conditions for hours, but spared New Orleans the worst brunt of the storm. Most buildings in Louisiana though flooded were spared direct impact of the powerfull waves that communities along the beaches in
Mississippi were subjected to. The City seemed to have escaped most of the catastrophic wind damage and heavy rain that had been predicted as a possibility. Damage, however was still very extensive, with windows and other debris blown out by heavy winds, and reports of widespread flooding and wind damage in the east of the city. But most buildings came through well structurally.
Furthermore, the heavy winds and storm surges had severely weakened the city's levee system, and there were reports of extensive failures of the
levees and flood walls protecting
New Orleans, Louisiana and surrounding communities. The
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet ("MR-GO") breached its levees in approximately 20 places, flooding much of New Orleans East, most of
Saint Bernard Parish and the East Bank of
Plaquemines Parish. The major
levee breaches in the city included breaches at the
17th Street Canal levee, the
London Avenue Canal, and the wide, navigable
Industrial Canal, which left approximately 80% of the city flooded.
[Murphy, Verity. "Fixing New Orleans' thin grey line." BBC News. October 4, 2005.] There were three major breaches at the
Industrial Canal; one on the upper side near the junction with MR-GO, and two on the lower side along the
Lower Ninth Ward, between Florida Avenue and Claiborne Avenue. The
17th Street Canal levee was breached on the lower (New Orleans West End) side inland from the Old Hammond Highway Bridge, and the
London Avenue Canal breached in two places, on the upper side just back from Robert E. Lee Boulevard, and on the lower side a block in from the Mirabeau Avenue Bridge. Flooding from the breaches put the majority of the city under water for days, in many places for weeks.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, engineers investigated the possibility that a failure in the design, construction, or maintenance caused much of the flooding. Originally, it was speculated that the levees had been overtopped by the storm surge, however this was later found not to be the case.
[Whoriskey, Peter; Warrick, Joby. "Shifting ground led to floodwall failure, investigators say." Houston Chronicle. October 8, 2005.] Some investigations pointed to the possibility of a weakening of the soil beneath the foundations of the flood walls due to storm water caused the ground to shift, which would indicate that a major design flaw made during the construction of the levees had been a major cause of the failures due to the storm.
[Warrick, Joby; Grunwald, Michael. "Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws." Washington Post. October 24, 2005.]Loss of life
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A U.S. Coast Guardsman searches for survivors in New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina. |
As of
May 19, 2006, the official number of deceased victims from Louisiana was 1,577.
["Reports of Missing and Deceased." Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. April 18, 2006.] The first deaths were reported shortly before midnight on
August 28, as three
nursing home patients died during an evacuation to
Baton Rouge, most likely due to dehydration.
On
September 4, Mayor Nagin speculated that the death toll could rise into the thousands after the clean-up was completed. Some survivors and evacuees reported seeing dead bodies lying in city streets and floating in still-flooded sections, especially in the east of the city. The advanced state of decomposition of many corpses, some of which were left in the water or sun for days before being collected, hindered efforts by coroners to identify many of the dead.
There were six deaths confirmed at the Superdome. Four of these were from natural causes, one was the result of a drug overdose, and one was a suicide. At the Convention Center, four bodies were recovered. One out of these four is believed to be the result of a homicide.
[Thevenot, Brian; Russell, Gordon. "Reports of anarchy at Superdome overstated." Seattle Times. September 26, 2005.] Body collection throughout the city began on approximately
September 9. Prior to that date, the locations of corpses were recorded, but most were not retrieved. There was a focus on living residents who refuse to evacuate.
Civil disturbances
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A fire raged in a downtown business the morning of September 2. |
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
looting, violence, and other
criminal activity became serious problems. With most of the attention of the authorities focused on rescue efforts, the security in New Orleans degraded quickly. By
August 30,
looting had spread throughout the city, often in broad daylight and in the presence of police officers. "The looting is out of control. The
French Quarter has been attacked," City Councilwoman Jackie Clarkson said. "We're using exhausted, scarce police to control looting when they should be used for search and rescue while we still have people on rooftops."
[Staff Writer. "Governor: Evac Superdome, Rescue Centers." Fox News. August 30, 2005.] Incapacitated by the breakdown of transportation and communication, as well as overwhelmed in terms of numbers, police officers could do little to stop crime, and shopkeepers who remained behind were left to defend their property alone.
[Staff Writer. "The looting is out of control." The Globe and Mail. August 31,2005.] Looters included gangs of armed gunmen, and gunfire was heard in parts of the city. Along with violent, armed robbery of non-essential valuable goods, many incidents were of residents simply gathering food, water and other essential commodities from unstaffed grocery stores. There were also reports of looting by some police officers.
[Fisher, David. "Kiwi cop one of six remaining in Katrina aftermath." New Zealand Herald. September 4, 2005.] There was also significant looting reported continually in areas of the city with few, if any permanent residents, such as the Lakeview, Gentilly, and the Midcity regions.
[Dwyer, Jim; Drew, Christopher. "Fear Exceeded Crime's Reality in New Orleans." New York Times. September 29, 2005.]"Sniper fire" was also reported throughout the city, targeted at rescue helicopters, relief workers, and police officers. One of the possibilities of the sniper fire was possibly resistance to relocation or evacuation.
[Jonsson, Patrick. "In New Orleans, not everyone wants to be rescued." Christian Science Monitor. September 6, 2005.] One report of violence involved police shooting six people on the Danziger Bridge, which carries the
Chef Menteur Highway across the industrial canal, who were reportedly attacking contractors of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers involved in the
17th Street Canal repair.
[Sabludowsky, Steve. "Death on New Orleans Bridge." Bayou Buzz. September 4, 2005.]Looting and violence was also hampering efforts to evacuate the
Tulane University medical center, as well. Looters in boats with guns had attempted to break into the hospital but were repelled by hospital staff. "If we don't have the federal presence in New Orleans tonight at dark, it will no longer be safe to be there, hospital or no hospital," Acadian Ambulance Services C.E.O. Richard Zuschlag told CNN. Several news sources reported instances of fighting, theft, rape, and even murder in the Superdome and other refuge centers.
[Staff Writer. "Britons describe hurricane ordeal." BBC News. September 6, 2005.] Looting was becoming a serious issue, as most of the city's 750 nuns had remained in the city during the storm. They refused to leave, even after Governor Blanco had ordered everyone left after the storm evacuated, because it would have been the only time in over 200 years that the clergy had left the city in a time of suffering. Many government officials were very concerned about their safety.
Additional acts of unrest occurred following the storm, particularly with the
New Orleans Police Department. In the aftermath, a tourist asked a police officer for assistance, and got the response
"Go to hell, it's every man for himself". Also, many
New Orleans police officers deserted the city in the days before the storm, many of them escaping in their department-owned patrol cars. This added to the chaos by stretching law enforcement thin. Additionally, there were reports of police officers stealing vehicles from car dealerships, further adding to the confusion.
Regaining control
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A National Guard humvee patrols the streets outside of the Louisisana Superdome. |
On
August 31, New Orleans's 1,500-member police force was ordered to abandon search and rescue missions and turn their attention toward controlling the widespread looting. The city also ordered a mandatory curfew. Mayor Nagin called for increased federal assistance in a, "desperate S.O.S.," following the city's inability to control looting and was often misquoted as declaring
martial law in the city, despite there being no such term in Louisiana state law (a declaration of a
state of emergency was instead made).
[Borger, Justin. "Mayor issues SOS as chaos tightens its grip." The Guardian. September 2, 2005.] On the same day, Governor
Kathleen Blanco announced the arrival of a military presence, stating that they, "
[knew] how to shoot and kill and [expected that] they [would]." Despite the increased law enforcement presence, crime continued to be problematic. Several armed attacks on relief helicopters, bus convoys, and police officers were reported, and fires erupted around the city at stores and a chemical storage facility. By
September 1, 6,500 National Guard troops had arrived in New Orleans, and on
September 2, Blanco requested a total of 40,000 for assistance in evacuation and security efforts in Louisiana.
[Breen, Allen G. "Explosions Fill New Orleans Sky With Smoke." ABC News. September 2, 2005.][Barringer, Felicity; Longman, Jere. "Police and Owners Begin to Challenge Looters." New York Times. September 1, 2005.]Some concern over the availability and readiness of the Louisiana National Guard to help stabilize the security situation was questioned. Guardsman Lieutenant Colonel Pete had commented that, "dozens of high water vehicles, humvees, refuelers, and generators were abroad."
[Zunes, Stephen. "A Hurricane of Consequences." Alternet. September 4, 2005.] At the time of the hurricane, approximately 3,000 members of the Guard were serving a tour of duty in Iraq. With total personnel strength of 11,000, this meant that 27% of the Louisiana National Guard was away.
[Berger, Julian; Campbell, Duncan. "Why did help take so long to arrive?" The Guardian. September 3, 2005.] However, both the
White House and the
Pentagon argued that the depletion of personnel and equipment did not impact the ability of the Guard to perform its mission â€" rather, impassable roads and flooded areas were the major factors impeding the Guardsmen from securing the situation in New Orleans.
Before Hurricane Katrina, the murder rate in New Orleans was ten times higher than the U.S. average. After the situation in New Orleans was brought under control, criminal activity in New Orleans dropped significantly.
[Ripley, Amanda. "What Happened to the Gangs of New Orleans?" Time Magazine. May 22, 2006.]The Superdome
 |
Displaced people bringing their belongings and lining up to get into the Superdome. |
|
Damage to the Superdome as a result of Katrina. |
As one of the largest structures in the city, evacuees were brought to the
Superdome to wait out the storm or to await further evacuation. Many others made their way to the Superdome on their own, hoping to find food, water, shelter, or transport out of town. On
August 29, Katrina passed over New Orleans with such force that it ripped two holes in the Superdome roof. On the evening of
August 30, Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, of the Louisiana National Guard, said that the number of people taking shelter in the Superdome had risen to around 15,000 to 20,000 as search and rescue teams brought more people to the Superdome from areas hard-hit by the flooding.
[Staff Writer. "Governor: Evac Superdome, Rescue Centers." Fox News/Associated Press. August 30, 2005.] As conditions worsened and flood waters continued to rise, on
August 31, Governor Blanco ordered that all of New Orleans, including the Superdome, be evacuated. The area outside the Superdome was flooded to a depth of three feet (1 m), with a possibility of seven feet (2.3 m) if the area equalized with Lake Pontchartrain. Governor Blanco had the state send in 68 school buses on Monday to begin evacuating people.
[Anderson, Ed. "School buses used to evacuate." Times-Picayune. September 1, 2005.]Despite increasingly squalid conditions, the population inside continued to grow. The situation inside the building was described as chaotic; reports of fights, rape, and filthy living conditions were widespread. As many as 100 were reported to have died in the Superdome, with most deaths resulting from heat exhaustion, but other reported incidents included an accused rapist who was beaten to death by a crowd and an apparent suicide.
[Staff Writer. "Britons describe hurricane ordeal." BBC News. September 6, 2005.] Despite these reports, though, the final official death toll was significantly less: six people inside (4 of natural causes, one overdose, and an apparent suicide) and a few more in the general area outside the stadium.
had announced that, in conjunction with
Greyhound, the National Guard, and
Houston Metro, the 25,000 people at the Superdome would be relocated across state lines to the
Houston Astrodome. Roughly 475 buses were promised by FEMA to ferry evacuees with the entire evacuation expected to take two days.
[Anderson, Ed; Moller, Jan. "Update on Superdome Evacuation." Times-Picayune. August 31, 2005.] By
September 4, the Superdome had been completely evacuated. Although the Superdome suffered damage by water and wind to the overall interior and exterior structures, as well as interior damage from human waste and trash, the facility is in the process of being repaired at a cost of
$140 Million and should be ready for games by the fall of 2006.
[Staff Writer. "NFL, at Saints' urging, kicks in $20 million for dome repairs." KCEN-TV. January 31, 2006.] The Saints' 2006 schedule shows that the team is expected to play its first game at the Superdome on September 25, 2006 (the third
Monday night of the regular season): two home
exhibition games will be played elsewhere.
New Orleans Convention Center
The
Ernest N. Morial Convention Center was broken into by
August 30. By
September 1, the facility, like the Superdome, was overwhelmed and declared unsafe and unsanitary. Reports of violence, beatings, and rape among those gathered in the convention center were widespread, though later questioned.
[Gifford, Alec. "40 Rapes Reported in Hurricane Katrina, Rita Aftermath." WDSU. December 23, 2005.][Burnett, John. "More Stories Emerge of Rapes in Post-Katrina Chaos." National Public Radio. December 21, 2005.] Several people died while sheltered within. Reports indicated that up to 20,000 people had gathered at the Convention Center, many dropped off after rescue from flooded areas of the city. Others were directed to the center by the police, headed by
Eddie Compass, as a possible refuge. However, even though there were thousands of evacuees at the center, along with network newscasters, pleading desperately for help on CNN, FOX, and other broadcast outlets, FEMA head Michael Brown and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff both claimed to have no knowledge of the use of the Convention Center as a shelter until the afternoon of
September 1.
[Staff Writer. "The big disconnect on New Orleans." CNN. September 2, 2005.] Still, for two days, the evacuees' pleas were ignored. On September 3, buses arrived in New Orleans to evacuate people from the Superdome; many of these same buses arrived at the convention center to pick up the refugees there. The Convention Center was completely evacuated by
September 4.
Evacuation efforts
On
August 31, a public health emergency was declared for the entire Gulf Coast, and
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco ordered a mandatory evacuation of all those remaining in New Orleans. Relief organizations scrambled to locate suitable areas for relocating refugees on a large scale. Many of the survivors in the Superdome were bussed to the
Reliant Astrodome in
Houston, Texas. Houston agreed to shelter an additional 25,000 evacuees beyond those admitted to the Astrodome, including one "renegade bus" that was commandeered by private citizen
Jabbar Gibson. By
September 1, the Astrodome was declared full and could not accept any more evacuees. The
George R. Brown Convention Center nearby was opened to house additional evacuees.
San Antonio, Texas also agreed to house 25,000 refugees, beginning relocation efforts in vacant office buldings on the grounds of KellyUSA, a former air force base, and the
Reunion Arena in
Dallas, Texas was mobilized to house incoming evacuees, and smaller shelters were established in towns across
Texas and
Oklahoma.
Arkansas also opened various shelters and state parks throughout the state for evacuees.
Expected to last only two days, the evacuation of remaining refugees proved more difficult than rescue organizations anticipated as transportation convoys struggled with damaged infrastructure and a growing number of evacuees. By the morning of
September 1, Governor Blanco reported that the number of evacuees in the Superdome was down to 2,500. However, by evening, eleven hours after evacuation efforts began, the Superdome held 10,000 more people than it did at dawn. Evacuees from across the city swelled the crowd to about 30,000, believing the arena was the best place to get a ride out of town.
Evacuation efforts were hastened on
September 2 by the wider dispersal of evacuees among newly-opened shelters.
Louis Armstrong International Airport was reopened to allow flights related to relief efforts, and began to load evacuees onto planes as well.
On
September 3, some 42,000 refugees were evacuated from New Orleans, including those remaining in the Superdome and Convention Center. Efforts turned to the hundreds of people still trapped in area hotels, hospitals, schools and private homes.
[Staff Writer. "House-to-house rescues under way in New Orleans." CNN. September 5, 2005.]On
September 6, Mayor Ray Nagin ordered a forced evacuation of everyone from the city who as not involved in clean up work, citing safety and health concerns.
[Staff Writer. "New Orleans will force evacuations." CNN. September 7, 2005.] The order was given not only as an attempt to restore law and order, but also out of concern about the hazardous living conditions in the city. Eviction efforts escalated three days later, when door-to-door searches were conducted to advise remaining residents to leave the city. Despite this, a number of residents defied the eviction order. While initially lax in enforcing evictions, National Guard troops eventually began to remove residents by force.
[Dwyer, Timothy; Tyson, Ann Scott. "Troops Escalate Urgency of Evacuation." Washington Post. September 9, 2005.]Health effects
There was a concern that the prolonged flooding would lead to an outbreak of health problems for those who remained in the city. In addition to
dehydration and
food poisoning, there was also potential for the spread of
hepatitis A,
cholera,
tuberculosis, and
typhoid fever, all related to the growing contamination of food and drinking water supplies in the city compounded by the city's characteristic heat and stifling humidity. Survivors could also face long-term health risks due to prolonged exposure to the petrochemical tainted flood waters and mosquito-borne diseases such as
yellow fever,
malaria and
West Nile Virus.
As of
September 2, an emergency
triage center has been set up at the airport. A steady stream of helicopters and ambulances brought in the elderly, sick, and injured. Baggage equipment was used as gurneys to transport people from the flight line to the hospital, which was set up in the airport terminal. The scene could be described as, "organized chaos," but efficient. By
September 3, the situation started to stabilize. Up to 5,000 people had been
triaged and fewer than 200 remained at the medical unit.
Hospital evacuations continued from other area hospitals that were flooded or damaged. Reports from the Methodist Hospital indicated that people were dying of dehydration and exhaustion while the staff worked unendingly in horrendous conditions. The first floor of the hospital flooded and the dead were stacked in a second floor operating room. Patients requiring ventilators were kept alive with hand-powered resuscitation bags.
On
September 6,
E. coli was detected in the water supply. According to the
CDC, five people died from bacterial infections caused by the toxic waters. The deaths appear to have been caused by
Vibrio vulnificus bacteria, of the
Cholera family.
[Staff Writer. "The latest on Katrina's aftermath." CNN. September 7, 2005.]*
Criticism of government response to Hurricane Katrina*
Hurricane Katrina effects by region*
Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi*
Hurricane preparedness for New Orleans*
Levee failures in Greater New Orleans, 2005*
Political effects of Hurricane Katrina*
Posse Comitatus Act*
Reconstruction of New Orleans
*
Video, aftermath of Hurricane Katrina*
NOVA scienceNOW: Hurricanes : New Orleans' unique vulnerability to hurricanes.
*
Block-by-block New Orleans flood map showing maximum water depth*
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Levee Maps*
Independent Levee Investigation Team Draft Report*
Orleans Parish Prison Before and After Katrina
