Essentialism
In
philosophy,
essentialism is a belief and practice centered on a philosophical claim, that, for any specific kind of entity it is at least theoretically possible to specify a finite list of characteristics —all of which any entity
must have to belong to the group defined.
A member of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor preclude its membership. It should be noted that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects, essences must result in properties of the object.
An
essence characterizes a
substance or a
form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in
Platonic realism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible world. Classical
humanism has an essentialist conception of the human being, which means that it believes in an eternal and unchangeable
human nature. This viewpoint has been criticized by
Marx,
Nietzsche,
Sartre, and many modern and existential thinkers.
The definition, in philosophical contexts, of the word "essence" is very close to the definition of
form (Gr. eidos). Many definitions of
essence harken back to the ancient Greek
hylomorphic understanding of the formation of the things of this world. According to that account, the structure and real existence of any thing can be understood by analogy to an artifact produced by a craftsman. The craftsman requires
hyle (timber or wood) and a model or plan or idea in his own mind according to which the wood is worked to give it the indicated contour or form (
morphe). In Plato's philosophy, things were said to come into being in this world by the action of a
demiurge (Gr. demiourgos) who works to form
chaos into ordered entities. (See Plato,
Timaeus.) Aristotle was the first to use the terms
hyle and
morphe. According to his explanation, all entities have two aspects, "matter" and "form." It is the particular form imposed that gives some matter its identity, its
quiddity or "whatness" (i.e., its "what it is").
Plato was an essentialist since he believed in ideal forms of which every object is just a poor copy. This belief is clearly manifested in his famous
parable of the cave.
Karl Popper splits the ambiguous term
realism into
essentialism and
realism. He uses
essentialism whenever he means the opposite of
nominalism, and
realism only as opposed to
idealism.
Essentialism in ethics is claiming that some things are wrong in an absolute sense, for example murder breaks a universal, objective and natural moral law and not merely an adventitious, socially or ethically constructed one.
Before
evolution was developed as a viable
scientific theory, there existed an essentialist view of
biology that posited all
species to be unchanging throughout time. These ideas were accepted
dogmatically by the
scholastic theologians of the
Middle Ages as derivatives of
Aristotelian ideals. Some religious opponents of
evolution continue to maintain this view of biology (see
creation-evolution controversy).
Essentialist positions on gender, race, or other group characteristics, consider these to be fixed traits, while not allowing for variations among individuals or over time. Contemporary proponents of
identity politics including
feminism,
gay rights, and anti-racist activists generally take
constructionist viewpoints, agreeing with
Simone de Beauvoir that "one is not born, but becomes a woman", for example. However, this is a vexed issue. To the extent that essence implies permanence and inalterability, essentialist thinking tends to agree with political
conservatism and mitigate against social change. But essentialist claims also have provided useful rallying-points for progressive politics, including feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial struggles. In a culture saturated with essentialist modes of thinking, an ironic or
strategic essentialism can sometimes be politically expedient.
In social thought, essentialism as a metaphysical claim is often
conflated with biological
reductionism. Most sociologists, for example, employ a distinction between biological
sex and
gender role. Similar distinctions across disciplines generally fall under the topic "
nature versus nurture." However, this conflation can be contested. For example,
Monique Wittig has argued that even biological sex is not an essence, and that the body's physiology is caught up in processes of social construction.
Essentialism is used by some historians in listing essential cultural characteristics of a particular nation or culture. A people can be understood in this way. These characteristics have degenerated into clichés serving to justify colonial practices. In other cases, the essentialist method has been used by members, or admirers, of an historical community to establish a praiseworthy national identity
[Touraj Atabaki, Beyond Essentialism: Who Writes Whose Past in the Middle East and Central Asia?, Inaugural Lecture as Extraordinary Professor of the Social History of the Middle East and Central Asia in the University of Amsterdam, 13 Dec. 2002, [1]]. Opposed to this model of interpretation are historical studies which turn from essences to focus on the particular circumstances of time and place.
In
cognitive psychology, essentialism refers to people's everyday tendency to assume, often unconsciously, that objects in nature have hidden essential properties that determine what kind of objects they are (e.g. all dogs have a 'dog essence'). Some experts claim that essentialism emerges very early in human development and is a cross-cultural universal, while others contend that it is a late-developing consequence of belonging to a culture in which essentialist reasoning is encouraged. Psychological essentialism is a theory about people's beliefs and is neutral with respect to the factual accuracy of these beliefs.
*
structuralism*
Traditionalist SchoolContrast with:
constructionism,
poststructuralism,
existentialismFor more information on Essentialism and related topics, see the
Dictionary of Philosophy by Dagobert D. Runes (Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1972). See the articles on essence, page 97, quiddity, p. 262, form,110, hylomorphism, 133, individuation,145, and matter, 191.