Lebanese Civil War
For the civil conflict of 1958, see Lebanon crisis of 1958.
*For the ongoing military conflict with Israel, see
2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict.
The
Lebanese Civil War (
1975–
1990) had its origin in the conflicts and political compromises after the end of
Lebanon's administration by the
Ottoman Empire and was exacerbated by the nation's changing
demographic trends,
Christian and
Muslim inter-religious strife, and the involvement of
Syria,
Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After a short break in the fighting in
1976 due to
Arab League mediation and Syrian intervention, civil strife continued, with fighting primarily focused in south Lebanon, controlled first by the PLO, then occupied by Israel.
During the course of the fighting, alliances shifted rapidly and unpredictably. By the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every other party at least once. The 1980s were especially bleak, with much of
Beirut laid in ruins during the
Israeli invasion that evicted the PLO from the country. A number of
war crimes and acts of
ethnic cleanses were commited by all the Lebanese factions participating in the war. The war deteriorated ever further into ethnic and religious carnage, and in the end, Lebanon's
independence counted among the casualties.
By the time of the
Taif Agreement in 1989, Israel held on to a
security zone in
southern Lebanon that it justified as a buffer to prevent attacks on northern Israel. The
Israeli Army eventually withdrew in 2000, only to see Syria fill the void from
positions it had held in northern Lebanon since the mid-70s. Syria did not withdraw its troops until 2005, when it was forced out by the joint pressure created by
Lebanese protest and powerful diplomatic intervention from the
USA,
France and the
UN in the aftermath of the assassination of
Rafik Hariri.
Constitutionally guaranteed
Christian control of the government had come under increasing fire from Muslims and secular left wing groups in the 1960s, leading them to join forces as the
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) in
1969. The LNM called for the taking of a new
census (the last one had been conducted in 1932) and the subsequent drafting of a new governmental structure that would reflect the actual population balance. This was perceived as a mortal threat for
Christian (especially
Maronite) power in Lebanon, although alliances were admittedly much more complex than the "
Muslims versus
Christians" rubric posited by some
Maronite leaders and many outside observers.
The two sides were unable to reconcile their conflicts of interest and began forming
militias, first for self-protection, but as things escalated ever more in parallel to the regular army. This rapidly undermined the authority of the central government. The government's ability to maintain order was also handicapped by the nature of the
Lebanese Army. One of the smallest in the
Middle East, it was composed based on a fixed ratio of religions. As members defected to sectarian militias, the army would eventually prove unable to contain the militant groups, rein in the
PLO or monitor foreign infiltration. Also, since the government was Christian-dominated, and the officers' ranks especially so, trust among Muslims for central institutions including the army was low. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army was eventually initiated by Muslim deserters declaring that they would no longer take orders from the Maronite generals.
Throughout the war most or all militias operated with little regard for
human rights, and the sectarian character of the conflict made
non-combatant civilians a frequent target. As the war dragged on, the militias deteriorated ever further into
mafia style organizations with many commanders turning to crime as their main preoccupation, rather than fighting. Finances for the war effort were obtained in one or all of three ways:
*
Outside support, generally from one of the rivalling
Arab governments or
Israel, or a
superpower, often with strings attached. Alliances would shift frequently.
*
Preying on the population. Extortion,
theft,
bank robberies and random
checkpoints at which "
customs" would be collected, were commonplace on all sides. During
cease-fires, most militias operated in their home areas as virtual mafia organizations.
*
Smuggling. During the civil war, Lebanon turned into one of the world's largest
narcotics producers, with much of the
hashish production centered in the
Bekaa valley. But much else was also smuggled, such as guns and supplies, all kinds of stolen goods and regular trade - war or no war, Lebanon would not give up its role as the middleman in
European-
Arab business. Many battles were fought over Lebanon's ports, to gain smuggler's access to the sea routes.
The major militias
Christian militias
Christian militias armed by
West Germany and
Belgium drew supporters from the larger and poorer
Christian population in the north of the country. They were generally right-wing in their political outlook, some of them formed under early impulses from European
Fascism. All the major Christian militias were
Maronite-dominated, and other Christian sects played a secondary role.
The most powerful of the Christian militias was that of the
Kataeb, or
Phalange, under the leadership of
Bachir Gemayel. The Phalange went on to help found the
Lebanese Forces in 1977 which came under the leadership of
Samir Geagea in 1986. A smaller faction was the extremist
Guardians of the Cedars. These militias quickly established strongholds in Christian-dominated East
Beirut, also the site of many government buildings.
In the north, the
Marada Brigades served as the private militia of the
Franjieh family and
Zgharta.
Shi'a militias
The
Shi'a militias were slow to form and join in the fighting. Initially, many Shi'a had been drawn to the Palestinian movement and the
Lebanese Communist Party, but after 1970's
Black September, there was a sudden influx of armed Palestinians to the Shi'a areas. The Palestinian movement quickly squandered its influence with the Shi'a, as radical factions ruled by the gun in much of Shi'a-inhabited southern Lebanon, where the refugee camps were accidentally concentrated, and the mainstream PLO proved either unwilling or unable to rein them in.
The Palestinian radicals'
secularism and arrogant behaviour had alienated the traditionalist Shi'a community, but simultaneously presented a model for
revolutionary politics that appealed to the young of Lebanon's poorest and most downtrodden community. After many years without their own independent political organizations, there suddenly arose
Musa Sadr's
Amal Movement in 1974-75. Its moderate
Islamist ideology immediately attracted the urban poor, and Amal's armed ranks grew rapidly. Later, in the early 1980s, a hard line faction would break away to join with Shi'a groups fighting
Israel to form the
Hezbollah guerrillas, who to this day remain the most powerful militia of Lebanon. Hezbollah was initially aided and trained by
Iran, and since the late 1980s, Hezbollah has also received backing from
Syria.
Sunni militias
Some
Sunni factions received support from
Libya and
Iraq, and a number of minor militias existed, the more prominent with
Nasserist or otherwise
pan-Arab and
Arab nationalist leanings, but a minor few
Islamist. The main Sunni-led organization was the
al-Murabitun. To compensate for weakness on the battlefield, the Sunni leadership turned early in the war to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was dominated by Palestinian Sunnis, although it also had a sizable
Christian (mainly
Greek Orthodox) minority.
The Druze
The small
Druze sect, strategically and dangerously seated on the
Chouf in central Lebanon, had no natural allies, and so were compelled to put much effort into building (and breaking) alliances. Under the leadership of the
Jumblatt family, first
Kamal Jumblatt (the LNM leader) and then his son
Walid, the
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) served as an effective Druze militia, building excellent ties to the
Soviet Union.
Non-religious groups
Although several Lebanese militias claimed to be
secular, most were little but vehicles for sectarian interest. Still, there existed a number of non-religious groups, primarily but not exclusively of the
far-left. Examples of this was the pro-
Moscow Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the more radical and independent
Communist Action Organization (COA). Another notable example was the
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which promoted the concept of
Greater Syria, in contrast to
Pan-Arab or Lebanese
nationalism. The SSNP was generally aligned with the
Syrian government, although it did not ideologically approve of
Hafez al-Assad's
Ba'thist regime.
The Palestinians
The
Palestinian movement, which had relocated most of its fighting strength to Lebanon after being expelled from
Jordan in the events known as
Black September in 1970, was formally under the umbrella of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - by itself undoubtedly Lebanon's most potent fighting force. But in actuality, the PLO was little more than a loose
confederation, and its leader,
Yassir Arafat, proved unable to control rival factions. This undermined both the PLO's operative strength and the sympathy of the Lebanese for the PLO, as the organization's outside image was increasingly being set by
Communist radicals, whose "revolutionary order" rarely turned out to be anything other than protection rackets. In the end, the PLO was held together more by shared interests and Arafat's continual attempts at intra-organizational mediation, than by any coherent organizational structure.
The mainstream
PLO, represented by Arafat's powerful
Fatah guerrillas, initially hesitated to take sides, but was eventually dragged into open conflict by more radical Palestinian factions. These were encouraged by radical
Arab states such as
Syria,
Iraq and
Libya, and espoused
Arab socialist or
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Among the most important were the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its splinter, the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Lesser roles were played by the fractious
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and another split-off from the PFLP, the Syrian-aligned
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). To complicate things, the
Ba'thist systems of
Syria and
Iraq both set up Palestinian puppet organizations within the PLO. The
as-Sa'iqa was a Syrian-controlled militia, parallelled by the
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under Iraqi command. The Syrian government could also count on the Syrian brigades of the
Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), formally but not functionally the PLO's regular army. Some PLA units sent by Egypt were under PLO (Arafatist) control, but never played the same dominant role as the heavily armed Syrian-backed factions.
In 1974, a stone was added to Arafat's burden with the near-formal breakup of the PLO. A controversial proposal (the
Ten Point Program) that aimed to make way for a
two-state solution had been advanced by
Arafat and
Fatah in the
Palestinian National Council (PNC). Under furious accusations of treason, much of the PLO's left wing simply walked out of the organization. With
Iraqi, and later
Syrian and
Libyan, backing, they formed the
Rejectionist Front, espousing a no-compromise line towards
Israel. The defectors included the PFLP, the
PFLP-GC, the
PLF,
as-Sa'iqa, ALF and several others, and discontent mounted also within
Fatah. Arafat would eventually manage to patch up the differences, but this would come back to haunt him throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and the split effectively prevented organizational unity in crucial stages of PLO's involvement in the Lebanese civil war.
As a result of the
Cairo Agreement brokered by Egyptian President
Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1969, the Lebanese were forced to allow a foreign force (the PLO) to conduct military operations against
Israel from their own territory. The PLO were granted full control over the
refugee camps, but soon much of southern Lebanon fell under their effective rule. As fighters poured in from Jordan after the
Black September destruction of the PLO's apparatus there, the PLO's presence became overbearing to many of inhabitants of these areas. The radical factions operated as a law unto themselves, and quickly alienated conservative
Shi'a villagers. Much the same way that the PLO had lost its welcome in
Jordan, Muslim support for the Palestinians began to erode in
Lebanon.
A significant left-wing opposition also started to evolve within Fatah, as radical veteran fighters from Jordan began pouring into its ranks, to the worry of Arafat himself. Still, Arafat set about building a "state-within-the-state" in southern Lebanon, to create a secure base area for the PLO, headquartered in the
Bekaa Valley and West
Beirut. Gradually the Lebanese authorities were being pushed into irrelevancy. Harsh
Israeli retribution after Palestinian raids from what was now termed "Fatahland" did nothing to endear the civilian
Shi'a and
Christian population to the Palestinian
guerrillas.
The PLO was welcomed, however, by the
Sunnis - who thought of them as a natural ally in sectarian terms - and by the
Druze. A personal friendship developed between Arafat and the charismatic Druze leader
Kamal Jumblatt, who not only headed the
PSP, but who had also set up a
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) to finally redress the wrongs of the sectarian quota system. Many of the
Rejectionist Front organizations joined the leftist LNM straightway, and indeed portions of the Fatah left followed. But Arafat was unwilling to commit the Palestinians to what he regarded as an intra-Lebanese conflict, fearing it would bog the movement down in Lebanon and unnecessarily alienate potential supporters among the Christians and their foreign allies.
Sectarian violence and civilian massacres
Throughout the spring of 1975, minor clashes had been building up towards all-out conflict, with the LNM pitted against the Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and cater to its Christian constituency. On the morning of
April 13,
1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a group of
Phalangist leaders leaving Church in the Christian
Beirut suburb of Ain Rumaneh, killing four people in what was probably an attempt on the life of
Pierre Gemayel. Hours later, Phalangists led by the
Gemayels,
killed 27 Palestinian workers travelling on a bus in Ein Al-Rumaneh; citywide clashes erupted. On
December 6,
1975, four Christians were killed in East Beirut. In retaliation, the
Phalange erected
roadblocks throughout the city, where identification cards were inspected for religious affiliation. Any Palestinian or Muslim caught was killed by having his throat cut. Opposing militias retaliated, and in growing reprisals, some 600 Muslims and Christians were butchered, on what became known as
Black Saturday. After this point, there was no going back, and all-out fighting began between the militias.
In a vicious spiral of sectarian violence, civilians were an easy target. On January 18, 1976 about 1,000 people were killed by Christian forces in the
Karantina Massacre, immediately followed by a Palestinian retaliatory strike on
Damour. Those inhabitants who did not manage to flee the village as it was assaulted by a motley crew of militias led by
Abu Musa, were gunned down or killed with knives;
hundreds perished. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic and religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into what was in effect Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Christian leftists who had allied with the
LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war revealed itself as an utterly sectarian conflict. Another effect of the massacres was to bring in Yassir Arafat's well-armed
Fatah and thereby the
PLO on the side of the LNM, as Palestinian sentiment was by now completely hostile to the Lebanese Christian forces.
Destruction of Damour
Two days later, January 20, 1976, Palestinians and their leftist allies launched their final assault on the Christian town of Damour which lay across the Sidon - Beirut highway about 20 km south of Beirut. The relentless pounding of the town resulted in many deaths. In the siege that had been established on 9 January, the Palestinians cut off food and water supplies and refused to allow the Red Cross to take out the wounded. Infants and children as well as the elderly died of dehydration.
On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defence Chamoun called in the mostly Christian manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb leftist positions near Damour in an attempt to halt the Palestinian attack. The use of the air force caused a government crisis as the Prime Minister Rachid Karame went out of his way to stop its intervention.
A plan was devised to evacuate Damour's civilians and fortunately the majority of the population of Damour was evacuated by sea. However, about 500 civilians defended by some 20 mostly Ahrar troops did not make it out in time. Damour was captured, the defenders executed, the civilians lined up against the walls of their houses and shot, and their houses dynamited. Many of the young women were raped and babies shot at close range in the back of the head. 149 bodies lay in the streets for days afterwards and 200 other civilians were never seen again. In all about 582 civilians had been murdered. Next, coffins were dug up in the old Christian cemetery, the dead robbed, vaults opened, and bodies and skeletons thrown across the graveyard. Damour was then transformed into a stronghold of Fatah and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).
The massacre incited Muslims and Christians to flee from areas controlled by the other side. Most Lebanese towns and neighbourhoods had been integrated, but these large-scale population transfers began to divide the country into segregated zones, the first step toward de facto partition.
Syrian intervention
In June,
1976, with fighting throughout the country and the Maronites on the verge of defeat,
President Suleiman Frangieh called for
Syrian intervention, on the grounds that the port of Beirut would be closed and that is how Syria received a large portion of their goods. Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the
Damour massacre, and both sides felt the stakes had been raised above mere political power. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian
Rejectionist Front and begin supporting the Maronite-dominated government. This technically put Syria on the same side as
Israel, as Israel had already begun to supply Maronite forces with arms, tanks, and military advisors in May 1976. (Smith, op. cit., 354). Syria had its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon, which harbored cells of the
Islamist and anti-
Ba'thist Muslim Brotherhood, and was also a possible route of attack for Israel.
At the President's request, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, occupying
Tripoli and the
Bekaa Valley, easily brushing aside the LNM and Palestinian defences. A cease-fire was imposed (Fisk, pp. 78-81), but it ultimately failed to stop the conflict, so Syria added to the pressure. With
Damascus supplying arms, Christian forces managed to break through the defenses of the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in East Beirut, which had long been under siege. A
massacre of about 2,000 Palestinians followed, which unleashed heavy criticism against Syria from the
Arab world.
In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the
Arab League summit in
Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an
Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. Other Arab nations were also part of the ADF, but they lost interest relatively soon, and Syria was again left in sole control, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield against international criticism. The Civil War was officially ended at this point, and an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut and most of the rest of Lebanon. In the south, however, the climate began to deteriorate as a consequence of the gradual return of PLO combatants, who had been required to vacate central Lebanon under the terms of the
Riyadh Accords.
An uneasy quiet
The nation was now effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and Muslim-based militias, and the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of
Mt. Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the
Green Line.
|
A rough approximation of the regions of control over Lebanese territory, 1976 |
In East Beirut, in 1977, Christian leaders of the
National Liberal Party (NLP), the
Kataeb Party and the
Lebanese Renewal Party joined in the
Lebanese Front, a political counterpart to the LNM. Their militias - the
Tigers,
Phalange and
Guardians of the Cedars - entered a loose coalition known as the
Lebanese Forces, to form a military wing for the Lebanese Front. From the very beginning, the Kataeb and Phalange, under the leadership of
Bashir Gemayel, dominated the LF. Through absorbing or destroying smaller militias, he both consolidated control and strengthened the LF into the dominant Christian force.
In March the same year,
Lebanese National Movement leader
Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. The murder was widely blamed on the
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), acting on behalf of the Syrian government. While Jumblatt's role as leader of the
Druze Progressive Socialist Party was filled surprisingly smoothly by his son,
Walid Jumblatt, the LNM disintegrated after his death. Although the anti-government pact of leftists, Shi'a, Sunni, Palestinians and Druze would stick together for some time more, their wildly divergent interests tore at opposition unity. Sensing the opportunity,
Hafez al-Assad immediately began splitting up both the Christian and Muslim coalitions in a game of divide and rule.
Israel intervenes in South Lebanon, 1978
Operation Litani
PLO attacks from Lebanon into Israel in 1977 and 1978 escalated tensions between the countries. On
11 March 1978, eleven Fatah militants landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to hijack two buses full of passengers on Haifa - Tel-Aviv road, shooting at passing vehicles. They killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis before being killed in the firefight with the Israeli forces. [
1] Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in
Operation Litani. The
Israeli Army occupied most of the area south of the
Litani River, resulting in the evacuation of at least 100,000 Lebanese (Smith, op. cit., 356), as well as approximately 2,000 deaths (Newsweek,
27 March 1978; Time,
3 April 1978; cited in Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, p. 485 n115). The
UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace.
The Security Zone
Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, but retained control of the southern region by managing a 12-mile wide "security zone" along the border. To hold these positions, Israel installed the
South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi'a proxy militia under the leadership of
Major Saad Haddad. Israel liberally supplied the SLA with arms and resources, and posted "advisors" to strengthen and direct the militia. The hard-line Israeli
Prime Minister,
Likud's
Menachem Begin, compared the plight of the Christian minority in southern Lebanon (then about 5% of the population in SLA territory) to that of
European
Jews during
World War II (Smith, op. cit., 355.).
Violent exchanges resumed between the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing rockets into northern Israel, Israel conducting air raids against PLO positions, and the SLA continuing its efforts to consolidate power in the border region.
Conflicts between Syria and the Phalange
Syria, meanwhile, clashed with the Phalange, a
Maronite militia led by
Bashir Gemayel, whose increasingly aggressive actions - such as his April 1981 attempt to capture the strategic city of
Zahle in central Lebanon - were designed to thwart the Syrian goal of brushing aside Gemayel and installing
Suleiman Frangieh as president. Consequently, the
de facto alliance between Israel and Gemayel strengthened considerably. In April 1981, for instance, during fighting in Zahle, Gemayel called for Israeli assistance. Israeli Prime Minister Begin responded by sending Israeli fighter jets to the scene, which shot down two Syrian helicopters. (Smith, op. cit., p. 373.) This led to Syrian
President Hafiz al-Assad's decision to place ground-to-air missiles on the hilly perimeter of Zahle.
Israel plans for attack
In August, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was re-elected, and in September, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon began to lay plans for a second invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of driving out the PLO. Sharon's intention was to "destroy the PLO military infrastructure and, if possible, the PLO leadership itself; this would mean attacking West Beirut, where the PLO headquarters and command bunkers were located" (Smith, op. cit., p. 377).
Sharon also wanted to "ensure the presidency of Bashir Gemayel, to be elected under Israeli auspices....As a payment for Israeli assistance, Sharon expected Gemayel, once installed as president, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, presumably stabilizing forever Israel's northern border" (Ibid.). Begin brought Sharon's plan before the Knesset in December 1981; however, after strong objections were raised, Begin felt compelled to set the plan aside. But Sharon continued to press the issue. In January 1982, Sharon met with Gemayel on an Israeli vessel off the coast of Lebanon and discussed a plan "that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of
Beirut International Airport" (Time,
15 February 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., 195). In February, with Begin's input,
Yehoshua Seguy, the chief of military intelligence, was sent to Washington to discuss the issue of Lebanon with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In the meeting, Haig "stressed that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon" (Smith, op. cit., p. 378).
Israel-PLO security situation
Thus far, no major provocation had been launched from Lebanon. In fact, during the entire effective period of the
cease-fire, August 1981 to May 1982, there was a total of one PLO rocket attack from Lebanese territory, in May. The attack was a retaliation for Israel's
9 May bombing of PLO positions in Lebanon, which was itself a retaliation for the PLO bombing of a Jerusalem bus. (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 196-7.) This particular exchange highlights a central problem with the cease-fire from the Israeli perspective: it applied only to the border with Lebanon, meaning that PLO attacks from other locations, such as Jordan and the West Bank, could (and did) continue unabated, while an Israeli response directed against the PLO in Lebanon would technically be a violation of the cease-fire.
Arafat, for his part, refused to condemn attacks occurring outside of Lebanon, on the grounds that the cease-fire was only relevant to the Lebanese theater. (Smith, op. cit., p. 376). Arafat's interpretation underscored the fact that the cease-fire agreement did nothing to address ongoing violence between the PLO and Israel in other theaters. Israel thus continued to weather PLO attacks throughout the cease-fire period. At the same time, it violated the terms of the cease-fire by committing "2125 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters" from August 1981 to May 1982, including the abovementioned
9 May bombing and the
21 April bombing of coastal PLO targets south of Beirut (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 195; the figures on territorial violations are cited by Alexander Cockburn & James Ridgeway, Village Voice,
22 June 1982, quoting UN records).
Israeli invasion of Lebanon
Argov assassination
On
3 June 1982, the
Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador
Shlomo Argov in
London.
Abu Nidal had assassinated numerous PLO diplomats, and attempted to kill both Arafat and
Mahmud Abbas, and was in fact condemned to death by the PLO (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 196). Additionally,
British intelligence reported that the attempt had likely been sponsored by
Iraq, and
Israeli intelligence agreed. However, none of this dissuaded
Ariel Sharon and
Menachem Begin, who ordered a retaliatory aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to over 100 casualties (Smith, op. cit., p. 378), a clear violation of the cease-fire.
The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon with rockets and artillery, which also constituted a clear violation of the cease-fire. Israel declared that this was the immediate cause of its subsequent decision to invade. Meanwhile, on
5 June, the
UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution (UNSCR 509) calling for "all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday,
6 June 1982." [
2].
June 6, 1982: Israel invades
Israel launched
Operation Peace for Galilee on
June 6,
1982, attacking PLO bases in Lebanon. Israeli forces quickly drove 25 miles into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and militia. When the Israeli cabinet convened to authorize the invasion, Sharon described it as a plan to advance 40 kilometers into Lebanon, demolish PLO strongholds, and establish an expanded security zone that would put northern Israel out of range of PLO rockets. In fact, Israeli chief of staff
Rafael Eitan and Sharon had already ordered the invading forces to head straight for Beirut, in accord with Sharon's blueprint dating to September 1981. After the invasion had begun, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution on
6 June,
1982, UNSCR 509, which reaffirms UNSCR 508 and "demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon" [
3]. Thus far the US had not used its veto. However, on
8 June,
1982, the US vetoed a proposed resolution that "reiterates [the] demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon" [
4], thereby giving implicit assent to the Israeli invasion.
Siege of Beirut
Main article: Siege of Beirut
By
15 June,
1982, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. The United States called for PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and Sharon began to order bombing raids of West Beirut, targeting some 16,000 PLO troops who had retreated into fortified positions. Meanwhile, Arafat attempted through negotiations to salvage politically what was clearly a disaster for the PLO, an attempt which eventually succeeded once the multinational force arrived to evacuate the PLO.
The fighting in Beirut resulted in approximately 6,700 deaths, 80 percent civilian, with 1,100 PLO deaths against 88 for the IDF. Fierce artillery duels between the IDF and the PLO, and PLO shelling of Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut at the outset gave way to escalating aerial IDF bombardment beginning on
21 July,
1982 [
5][
6]. It is commonly estimated that during the entire campaign, approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians, and 30,000 were wounded.
Negotiations for a cease-fire
On
26 June, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed that "demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometres from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps" [
7]; the United States vetoed the resolution because it was "a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force" (New York Times,
27 June 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., p. 198), an indication of Washington's support for Sharon's objective of destroying the PLO before it could negotiate a withdrawal agreement.
Finally, amid escalating violence and civilian casualties,
Philip Habib was once again sent to restore order, which he accomplished on
12 August on the heels of Sharon's intensive, day-long bombardment of West Beirut. The Habib-negotiated truce called for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements, as well as a multinational force composed of
U.S. Marines along with
French and
Italian units that would ensure the departure of the PLO and protect defenseless civilians.
International intervention: 1981–84
A multinational force landed in
Beirut on
August 20,
1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from
Lebanon and U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from
Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of
U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units.
However, Israel claimed that some 2,000 PLO militants were hiding in Palestinian
refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. Accordingly, on
12 September,
Bashir Gemayel, who had been elected president under Israeli military control on
23 August, agreed to send troops from his Phalange militia into the camps. Then, on
14 September, Gemayel was assassinated. Many have suspected that Syria had a hand in his assassination.
Sabra and Shatila Massacre
See Sabra and Shatila massacreAfter conferring with Phalange leaders, Sharon and Eitan bypassed the Israeli cabinet and sent Israeli troops into West Beirut, violating the Habib agreement; these troops helped transport approximately 200 Phalange personnel to the camps, which the Phalangists entered on
16 September at 6:00 P.M. The Phalangists remained in the camps until the morning of
19 September, massacring an estimated 700-3,000 Palestinians, according to official Israeli statistics, "none apparently members of any PLO unit" (Smith, op. cit., 380-1).
The
Kahan Commission, set up by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances of the massacre, held Sharon and Eitan indirectly responsible, concluding that the Israeli officials should have known what would happen if they sent 200 anti-Palestinian militants into Palestinian refugee camps. The Commission recommended that Sharon resign his post as Defense Minister, which he did, though he remained in the government as an influential Minister without Portfolio (Chomsky, op. cit., 406).
The massacres made the headlines all over the world, and calls were heard for the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon. As a result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO's evacuation returned as peacekeepers. With U.S. backing,
Amine Gemayel was chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.
May 17 Agreement
On
May 17,
1983, Amin Gemayel's Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement (
text) on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops; reportedly after the US and Israel exerted severe pressure on Gemayel. The agreement stated that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists." Thus, the agreement in effect amounted to a peace agreement with Israel, and was additionally seen by many Lebanese Muslims as an attempt for Israel to gain a permanent hold on the Lebanese South[
8]. The
May 17 Agreement was widely portrayed in the
Arab world as an imposed surrender, and Amin Gemayel was accused of acting as a
Quisling President; tensions in Lebanon hardened considerably. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.
In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the
Chouf District (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Chouf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone. The IDF would remain in this zone, in violation of UN Security Council resolution 425, until 2000.
Resurging violence
The virtual collapse of the
Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayel. On
5 March the Lebanese Government cancelled the May 17 Agreement, and the Marines departed a few weeks later.
|
Control over Lebanese territory, 1983 |
This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of attacks against U.S. and Western interests, such as the
18 April 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut, which killed 63. Following the bombing, the
Reagan White House "ordered naval bombardments of Druze positions, which resulted in numerous casualties, mostly non-combatant," and the "reply to the American bombardments" was the suicide attack (Smith, op. cit., 383). Then, on
23 October,
1983, a devastating
suicide bombing in Beirut targeted the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen [
9]. On
January 18,
1984, American University of Beirut President
Malcolm Kerr was murdered. After US forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-US attacks continued, including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on
20 September 1984, which killed 9, including 2 U.S. servicemen.
During these years,
Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of
Shi'a groups resisting the Israeli occupation of the splintered from the main Shi'a movement,
Nabih Berri's
Amal Movement. The group found inspiration for its revolutionary
Islamism in the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, and gained early support from about 1,500
Iranian Pasdaran Guards. With Iranian assistance, and a large pool of disaffected Shi'a refugees from which to draw support, Hezbollah quickly grew into a strong fighting force.
Worsening conflict and political crisis
Between
1985 and
1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the
War of the Camps of 1985-86 as a Syrian-backed coalition headed by the Amal militia sought to rout the PLO from their Lebanese strongholds. Many thousands of Palestinians died, and the
Sabra,
Shatila, and
Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camps were largely destroyed. (Fisk, 609)
Major combat returned to Beirut in
1987, when Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in
1988 between Amal and Hezbollah. Hezbollah swiftly seized command of several Amal-held parts of the city, and for the first time emerged as a strong force in the capital.
The Aoun government
Meanwhile, Prime Minister
Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of
1984, was assassinated on
June 1,
1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September
1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian,
Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding
General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the
National Pact. Conflict in this period was also exacerbated by increasing
Iraqi involvement, as Saddam Hussein searched for proxy battlefields for the
Iran-Iraq War. To counter Iran's influence through Amal and Hezbollah, Iraq backed Christian groups;
Saddam Hussein helped Aoun between 1988-1990.[
10]
Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to
Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military
The Taif Agreement
The
Taif Agreement of
1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the
Arab League, chaired by
Kuwait and including
Saudi Arabia,
Algeria, and
Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in
Ta'if,
Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on
November 4 and elected
Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Military leader Michel Aoun in East Beirut refused to accept Mouawad, and denounced the Taif Agreement.
Mouawad was assassinated 16 days later in a
car bombing in Beirut on
22 November as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by the
Elias Hrawi (who remained in office until
1998). Aoun again refused to accept the election, and dissolved Parliament.
Infighting in East Beirut
On
January 16,
1990, General Aoun ordered all Lebanese media to cease using terms like "President" or "Minister" to describe Hrawi and other participants in the Taif government. The
Lebanese Forces, which had grown into a rival powerbroker in the Christian parts of the capital, protested by suspending all its broadcasts. Aoun shut down other newspapers who refused to comply. (Harris, 268) Tension with the LF grew, as Aoun feared that the militia was planning to link up with the Hrawi administration.
In early
1990, Aoun's forces clashed with the LF, after Aoun had stated that it was in the national interest for the government to "unify the weapons" (i.e. that the LF must submit to his authority as acting head of state). This brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and although the LF made initial advances, the intra-Christian warfare eventually sapped the militia of most of its fighting strength. It then turned to Syria for support.
In August
1990, the Lebanese Parliament, which didn't heed Aoun's order to dissolve, and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was for the first time divided equally between Christians and Muslims.
Aoun's "War of Liberation"
By March 1990, after having subdued the LF, Aoun launched what he termed a "war of liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. As a result, Syrian pressure on his Lebanese Army and militia pockets in East Beirut grew, and as
Saddam Hussein focused his attention on Kuwait, Iraqi supplies dwindled. Still, Aoun persisted in the "war of liberation", denouncing the regime of
Hafez al-Assad and claiming that he fought for Lebanon's independence. While he seems to have had significant Christian support for this, he was still perceived as a sectarian leader among others by the Muslim population, who distrusted his agenda. He was also plagued by the challenge to his legitimacy put forth by the Syrian-backed West Beirut government of
Elias Hrawi.
In October 1990, Syria launched a
major operation involving its army, air force and Lebanese allies against Aoun's stronghold around the presidential palace, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were executed . It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets, cementing its hold on the capital. Aoun fled to the French Embassy in Beirut, and later into exile in
Paris. He was not able to return until May 2005.
William Harris claims that the Syrian operation could not take place until Syria had reached an agreement with the United States, that in exchange for support against the
Iraqi regime of
Saddam Hussein in the
Gulf War, it would convince Israel not to attack Syrian aircraft approaching Beirut. Aoun claimed in 1989 that the United States "has sold Lebanon to Syria" (Harris, p. 260).
In March
1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May
1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the
Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.
Some violence still occurred. In late December
1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of
Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister
Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car.
|
A war-damaged building in Beirut, still unrepaired in 2004 |
Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Only Hezbollah retains its weapons, due to what it claims is legitimate resistance against Israel in the
Shebaa Farms area.
Lebanon still bears deep scars from the civil war. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and another 100,000 handicapped by injuries. Approximately 900,000 people, representing one-fifth of the pre-war population, were displaced from their homes. Perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. Thousands of
land mines remain buried in the previously contested areas. Some Western hostages kidnapped during the mid-
1980s (many claim by Hezbollah, though the movement denies this) were held until May 1992. Lebanese victims of kidnapping and wartime "disappeared" number in the tens of thousands.
Car bombs became a favored weapon of violent groups worldwide, following their frequent, and often effective, use during the war. In the 15 years of strife, there were at least 3,641 car bombs, which left 4,386 people dead and thousands more injured [
11].
The country has made progress toward rebuilding its political institutions and regaining its national sovereignty since the end of the war, establishing a political system that gives Muslims a greater voice in the political process. Critics, however, charge that the new arrangements institutionalize sectarian divisions in the government.
External links
*
Lebanese civil war from April 13, 1975 to October 13, 1990 & War on Lebanon 2006 Full of Pictures*
Lebanese civil war*
The Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreementBook References
* Bregman, Ahron (2002).
Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415287162
The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 Khazen Farid El (2000) (ISBN 0674081056)
The Bullet Collection, a book by Patricia Ward, is an excellent account of human experience during the Lebanese Civil War.
Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 O'Ballance Edgar (1998) (ISBN 0312215932)
Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 Salibi Kamal S. (1976) (ISBN 0882060104)
Death of a country: The civil war in Lebanon. Bulloch John (1977) (ISBN 0297772880)
Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton Series on the Middle East) Harris William W (1997) (ISBN 1558761152)
The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians Noam Chomsky (1983, 1999) (ISBN 0896086011)
History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 Hitti Philip K. (2002) (ISBN 1931956618)
Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition Picard, Elizabeth (2002) (ISBN 084191415X)
Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) Haley P. Edward , Snider Lewis W. (1979) (ISBN 0815622104)
Lebanon: Fire and Embers : A History of the Lebanese Civil War by Hiro, Dilip (1993) (ISBN 0312097247)
Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War Fisk, Robert (2001) (ISBN 0192801309)
Syria and the Lebanese Crisis Dawisha A. I. (1980) (ISBN 0312782039)
Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process Deeb Marius (2003) (ISBN 1403962480)
The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 Rabinovich Itamar (1985) (ISBN 0801493137)
Documentaries
*
Online Reference
*
Lebanese groups unite over Syria-BBC News
13 December 2004*
Lebanon Facts-PBS Frontline Series May 2003
*
Links and Resources-PBS Frontline May 2003
*
Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War-Washington Post Foreign Service
20 December 1999*
Pictures of Battle Scared Beirut-Travel Adventures.
Additional Resources
*
Center for Lebanese Study-Oxford University
*
Country Profile: Lebanon-BBC News
*
Timeline: Lebanon A chronology of key events-BBC News
14 February 2005*
A detailed chronology on the Lebanese War-Cederland
