Robert McNamara
Robert Strange McNamara (born
June 9,
1916) is an
American business executive and a former
United States Secretary of Defense. McNamara served as Secretary of Defense from
1961 to
1968, during the
Vietnam War period. He resigned that position to become President of the
World Bank (
1968â€"
1981).
Robert McNamara was born in
San Francisco where his father was sales manager of a wholesale shoe firm. He became an
Eagle Scout, and graduated in
1937 from the
University of California, Berkeley with a
Bachelor of Arts in economics with minors in
mathematics and
philosophy, was elected to
Phi Beta Kappa in his
sophomore year, and earned a varsity letter in crew. He was a member of the UC Berkeley Golden Bear Battallion, Army ROTC. He then earned a master's degree from the
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in
1939.
After earning his MBA, McNamara worked a year for the
accounting firm of
Price Waterhouse in
San Francisco. In August
1940 he returned to
Harvard to teach in the
Business School and became the highest paid Assistant Professor at the time. Following his involvement there in a program to teach the analytical approaches used in business to officers of the
Army Air Forces (AAF), he entered the Army as a
captain in early
1943, serving most of the war with the AAF's Office of Statistical Control. One major responsibility was the analysis of U.S. bombers' efficiency and effectiveness, especially the B-29 forces commanded by Major General
Curtis LeMay in China and the Marianas Islands. Contrary to some reports, McNamara did not help plan the March 9,
1945 fire bombing of Tokyo, but he informed Washington of its success, as the Japanese placed the toll at some 83,000 people. (Rich Frank:
Downfall, Random House, 1999.) He left active duty in 1946 with the rank of
lieutenant colonel and with a
Legion of Merit.
In
1946 McNamara joined
Ford Motor Company, due to the influence of a Colonel he worked under named
Charles "Tex" Thornton. Thornton had read an article in
Life magazine which reported that the company was in dire need of reform. He was one of ten former WW II officers known as the "
Whiz Kids", who helped the company to stop its losses and administrative chaos by implementing modern planning, organization, and management control systems. Starting as manager of
planning and financial analysis, he advanced rapidly through a series of top-level management positions. McNamara opposed Ford's planned
Edsel automobile and worked to stop the program even before the first car rolled off the assembly line. He eventually succeeded in ending the program in November 1960. McNamara also came close to terminating
Lincoln, forcing product planners to reinvent the car for 1961. On
9 November 1960 McNamara became the first president of
Ford from outside the family of
Henry Ford. McNamara received substantial credit for
Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period.
|
President Kennedy and McNamara, 1962 |
President-elect
John F. Kennedy first offered the post of secretary of defense to former secretary
Robert A. Lovett. Lovett declined but recommended McNamara; Kennedy had him approached by
Sargent Shriver (regarding either the Treasury or the Defense cabinet post), less than five weeks after becoming president at
Ford. At first McNamara turned down the Treasury position, but eventually after discussions with his family, McNamara accepted Kennedy's invitation to serve as
Secretary of Defense.
Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy, in his own words "providing aggressive leadership questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress." He rejected radical organizational changes, such as those proposed by a group Kennedy appointed, headed by Sen.
W. Stuart Symington, which would have abolished the military departments, replaced the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with a single chief of staff, and established three functional unified commands. McNamara accepted the need for separate services but argued that "at the end we must have one defense policy, not three conflicting defense policies. And it is the job of the Secretary and his staff to make sure that this is the case."
Initially the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to
Congress on
March 28,
1961 guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of
first-strike attack and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under
civilian command and control, and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general war." The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with allies, was "to prevent the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars." Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of
flexible response. The United States wanted choices in an emergency other than "inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation," as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges confronting the United States initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's limited warfare capabilities. These moves were significant because McNamara was abandoning
Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation in favor of a flexible response strategy that relied on increased U.S. capacity to conduct limited, non-nuclear warfare.
He also created the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Supply Agency.
Communism
The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving ability to counter
communist "wars of national liberation," in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and resorted to political subversion and
guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962 annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination." In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as
South Vietnam, for
counterinsurgency operations.
Increased attention to conventional strength complemented these special forces preparations. In this instance he called up reserves and also proceeded to expand the regular armed forces. Whereas active duty strength had declined from approximately 3,555,000 to 2,483,000 between
1953 (the end of the
Korean conflict) and
1961, it increased to nearly 2,808,000 by
30 June 1962. Then the forces leveled off at around 2,700,000 until the Vietnam military buildup began in
1965, reaching a peak of nearly 3,550,000 by mid-1968, just after McNamara left office.
Crisis
In the broad arena of national security affairs, McNamara played a principal part under both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, especially during international crises. The first of these occurred in April
1961, when a Cuban exile group with some support from the United States attempted to overthrow the
Castro regime. The disastrous failure of the
Bay of Pigs invasion, carried through by the Kennedy administration based on planning begun under Eisenhower, proved a great embarrassment. When McNamara left office in
1968, he told reporters that his principal regret was his recommendation to Kennedy to proceed with the
Bay of Pigs operation, something that "could have been recognized as an error at the time."
More successful from McNamara's point of view was his participation in the
Executive Committee, a small group of advisers who counseled Kennedy during the
Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. McNamara supported the president's decision to
quarantine Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from bringing in more offensive weapons. During the crisis the Pentagon placed U.S. military forces on alert, ready to back up the administration's demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its offensive missiles from Cuba. McNamara believed that the outcome of the missile crisis "demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces to meet a sudden emergency" and "highlighted the importance of maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment." Similarly, McNamara regarded the use of nearly 24,000 U.S. troops and several dozen naval vessels to stabilize a revolutionary situation in the
Dominican Republic in April
1965 as another successful test of the "readiness and capabilities of the U.S. defense establishment to support our foreign policy."
McNamara's principal goal was deterrence â€" convincing
Moscow that a nuclear attack against the Western allies would trigger U.S. retaliation against Soviet forces, thereby eliminating Moscow's ability to pursue further military action. McNamara also wanted to provide the Russians with an incentive to refrain from attacking cities. "The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces," he said in the
Ann Arbor speech, "make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it."
McNamara soon deemphasized the no-cities approach, for several reasons: public fear that planning to use nuclear weapons in limited ways would make nuclear war seem more feasible; increased Air Force requirements, after identifying additional targets under the no-cities strategy, for more nuclear weapons; the assumption that such a policy would require major air and missile defense, necessitating a vastly expanded budget; and negative reactions from the Soviets and NATO allies. McNamara turned to "assured destruction," which he characterized as the capability "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the
United States and its allies by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first strike." As defined by McNamara,
assured destruction meant that the United States would be able to destroy in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the
Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. Later the term
Mutual Assured Destruction meant the capacity of each side to inflict sufficient damage on the other to constitute an effective deterrent. In conjunction with assured destruction McNamara stressed the importance of damage limitation, the use of strategic forces to limit damage to the nation's population and industrial capacity by attacking and diminishing the enemy's strategic offensive forces.
To make this strategy credible, McNamara sped up the modernization and expansion of weapon and delivery systems. He accelerated production and deployment of the solid-fuel
Minuteman ICBMs and
Polaris SLBMs and by FY
1966 had removed from operational status all of the older liquid-fuel Atlas and Titan I missiles. By the end of McNamara's tenure, the United States had deployed 54 Titan II and 1,000 Minuteman missiles on land, and 656 Polaris missiles on 41 nuclear
submarines. The size of this long-range strategic missile force remained stable until the
1980s, although the number of warheads increased significantly as the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) system emerged in the late
1960s and the
1970s.
Other steps
McNamara took other steps to improve U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He raised the portion of
SAC strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert from 25 percent to 50 percent, thus lessening their vulnerability to missile attack. In December
1961 he established the
Strike Command (STRICOM). Authorized to draw forces when needed from the
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the
Tactical Air Command, and the airlift units of the
Military Air Transport Service and the military services, Strike Command had the mission "to respond swiftly and with whatever force necessary to threats against the peace in any part of the world, reinforcing unified commands or… carrying out separate contingency operations." McNamara also increased long-range
airlift and
sealift capabilities and funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara in
1961 consolidated these functions in the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Communications Agency (the latter originally established by Secretary Gates in
1960), having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. The end effect was to remove the Intelligence function from the control of the military and to put it under the control of the Secretary of Defense. In the same year, he set up the
Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory management under the control of the Secretary of Defense rather than the uniformed military.
McNamara's institution of
systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters occasioned much debate. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara era,
Alain C. Enthoven and
K. Wayne Smith, described the concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary… The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith said they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because they could apply independent points of view to force planning. McNamara's tendency to take military advice into account less than had previous secretaries and to override military opinions contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders. It was also generally thought that Systems Analysis, rather than being objective, was tailored by the civilians to support decisions that McNamara had already made.
The most notable example of systems analysis was the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by
United States Department of Defense Comptroller Charles J. Hitch. McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented Defense
budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policymaking levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis, that is, each analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusions." In practice, the data produced by the analysis was so large and so complex that while it was available to all interested parties, none of them could challenge the conclusions.
Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development Concept Paper (DCP). The annual FYDP was a series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years in mission-oriented, rather than individual service, programs. By
1968, the FYDP covered 10 military areas: strategic forces, general purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance, training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.
The DPM, intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office, was a method to study and analyze major Defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between
1961 and
1968 on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces,
NATO strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs to the services and the JCS for comment; in making decisions, McNamara included in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches, force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document. The DPM was hated by the JCS and uniformed military in that it cut their ability to communicate directly to the White House. The DPMs were also disliked because the systems analysis process was so heavyweight that it was impossible for any service to effectively challenge its conclusions.
The
Development Concept Paper examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program. But in practice, what it proved to be was a cost burden that became a barrier to entry for companies attempting to deal with the military. It aided the trend toward a few large non-competitive defense contractors serving the military. Rather than serving any useful purpose, the overhead necessary to generate information that was often in practice ignored resulted in increased costs throughout the system.
The Readiness, Information, and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
ABM
Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an antiballistic missile (
ABM) system proposed for installation in the United States, arguing that it would be too expensive (at least $40 billion) and ultimately ineffective, because the Soviets would increase their offensive capability to offset the defensive advantage of the United States. Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project, McNamara finally agreed to a "thin" system, but he never believed it wise for the United States to move in that direction.
He always believed that the best defense strategy for the US was a parity of mutually assured destruction with the Soviet Union. An ABM system would be an ineffective weapon as compared to an increase in deployed nuclear missile capacity.
Cost Reductions
McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decision making on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars…. You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." Acting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program, which, he reported, saved $14 billion in the five-year period beginning in
1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary to national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures. But in the end, most of the cost savings were illusionary. Every base he closed resulted in a new construction project elsewhere to expand another base, relocation of forces projects and other related spending. The actual cost savings through consolidation of installations was often minimal or in some cases negative.
Due to the nuclear arms race, the Vietnam War buildup and other projects,
total obligational authority increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year
TOA increased from $48.4 billion in
1962 to $49.5 billion in
1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to $74.9 billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in office. Not until FY
1984 did DoD's total obligational authority surpass that of FY
1968 in constant dollars.
Program Consolidation
One major hallmark of Mcnamara's cost reductions was the consolidation of programs from different services, most visibly in fighter acquisition, believing that the redundancy created waste and unnecessary spending. McNamara who directed the Air Force to adopt the Navy's
F-4 Phantom and
A-7 fighters, a consolidation that was quite successful. He tried to extend his success by merging development programs as well, resulting in the
TFX dual service
F-111 dual service fighter project. It was to combine Air Force requirements for an
air superiority fighter and tactical bomber, His experience in the corporate world led him to believe that adopting a single type for different missions and service would save money. He insisted on the General Dynamics entry over the DOD's preference for Boeing because of commonality issues. Though heralded as a fighter that could do everything - fast supersonic dash, slow carrier and short airfield landings, tactical strike, and even close air support, in the end it involved too many compromises to succeed at any of them. The Navy version was drastically overweight and difficult to land, and eventually killed after a
Grumman study showed it was incapable of matching the (overestimated) abilities of the newly revealed
Mig-23 and
Mig-25. The F-111 would eventually find its niche as a tactical bomber and electronic warfare aircraft with the Air Force.
However, many analysts believe that even though the TFX project itself was a failure, McNamara was ahead of his time as the trend in fighter design has continued toward consolidation - the
F-16 and
F/A-18 were developed as multi-role fighters, and most modern designs combine many of the roles the TFX would have. In many ways, the
JSF is seen as a rebirth of the TFX project, in that it purports to satisfy the needs of three American Air arms (as well as several foreign customers), fulfilling the roles of strike fighter, carrier-launched fighter, VSTOL, and CAS (and drawing many criticisms similar to those leveled against the TFX).
Vietnam
The Vietnam conflict came to claim most of McNamara's time and energy. The
Truman and
Eisenhower administrations had committed the United States to support the French and native anti-Communist forces in Vietnam in resisting efforts by the Communists in the North to control the country. The U.S. role, including financial support and military advice, expanded after
1954 when the French withdrew. During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. military advisory group in South Vietnam steadily increased, with McNamara's concurrence, from just a few hundred to about 17,000. U.S. involvement escalated after the
Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August
1964 when North Vietnamese naval vessels reportedly fired on two U.S. destroyers. President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases and Congress approved almost unanimously the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression."
As the war expanded in Southeast Asia in 1964, the Johnson Administration was increasingly focused on the November presidential election, seeking to minimize America's growing and often covert involvement in Vietnam. Consequently, McNamara frequently failed to pass along the Joint Chiefs' comments or objections to administration policy, or misrepresented those views to the president. Following the retirement of Admiral
George W. Anderson, Army General
George Decker, and Air Force chief
Curtis LeMay, the JCS became increasingly compliant to Johnson and McNamara's wishes. (H.R. McMaster,
Dereliction of Duty, Harper Perennial, 1997.)
In
1965, in response to stepped up military activity by the nationalist (anti-American)
Viet Cong in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the United States began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces, and entered into combat in South Vietnam. McNamara's plan, supported by requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of
1967 and almost 535,000 by
30 June 1968. The casualty lists mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated. Against the views of many of the top leaders in the military, McNamara put in place a statistical strategy for victory in Vietnam. He concluded that there were a limited number of Viet Cong fighters in Vietnam and that a war of attrition would destroy them. He applied metrics (body counts) to determine how close to success his plan was.
Although he was a prime architect of the Vietnam War and repeatedly overruled the JCS on strategic matters, McNamara years later claimed that he had gradually become skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam. None of his contemporaries remember him being anything other than an enthusiastic supporter of the war. He also has often claimed that his support of the Vietnam war was done out of loyalty to administration policy. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand. He became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders but offered little in the way of alternatives.
Departure from DoD
As McNamara grew more and more controversial after
1966 and his differences with the president and the JCS over
Vietnam strategy became the subject of public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that he would leave office. In early November
1967, McNamara's recommendation to freeze troop levels, stop bombing
North Vietnam and for the US to hand over ground fighting to
South Vietnam was rejected outright by President
Lyndon B. Johnson. McNamara's recommendations amounted to him saying that all the policies he had been promoting for years were wrong, and that his strategy for winning the war was a failure. Given that he had been forcing decisions with regard to the war on the JCS, he was left discredited and without any remaining support. Lyndon Johnson was dismayed that the man who had created the strategy for the war and supported it at every step had almost overnight changed his mind. McNamara seemed blind to the political and practical consequences of reversing policy. Largely as a result, on
November 29 of that year, McNamara announced his pending resignation and that he would become President of the
World Bank. Other factors were the increasing intensity of the anti-war movement in the United States, the approaching presidential campaign, in which Johnson was expected to seek re-election and McNamara's support over opposition by the JCS of construction along the 17th parallel separating South and North Vietnam of a line of fortifications running from the coast of Vietnam into Laos. The President's announcement of McNamara's move to the World Bank stressed his stated interest in the job and that he deserved a change after seven years as Secretary of Defense, much longer than any of his predecessors.
Other sources give a different view of McNamara's departure from office. For example,
Stanley Karnow in his book "Vietnam: A History" strongly suggests that McNamara was asked to leave by the President. McNamara himself has expressed lack of certainty about the question.
[In The Fog of War he recounts saying to a friend, "Even to this day, Kay, I don't know whether I quit or was fired?" (See transcript)]McNamara left office on
29 February 1968; for his efforts, the President awarded him both the
Medal of Freedom and the
Distinguished Service Medal.
Shortly after McNamara departed the Pentagon, he published "The Essence of Security," discussing various aspects of his tenure and position on basic national security issues. He did not speak out again on defense issues until after he left the
World Bank. He did not explain or defend his decisions about Vietnam in the book or during his years at the World Bank.
Evaluations of McNamara's long career as Secretary of Defense vary from glowing to scathing due to his role in Vietnam. He was labeled as highly hawkish in nature.
In an example of the former, a congressman who had helped shape the
National Security Act in
1947 stated when McNamara left the
Pentagon that he "has come nearer [than anyone else] to being exactly what we planned a Secretary of Defense to be when we first wrote the
Unification Act."
Former
Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, "Except for General Marshall I do not know of any department head who, during the half century I have observed government in Washington, has so profoundly enhanced the position, power and security of the United States as Mr. McNamara."
Journalist
Hanson W. Baldwin cited an impressive list of McNamara accomplishments:
* containment of the more damaging aspects of service rivalry;
* significant curtailment of duplication and waste in weapon development;
* institution of systems analysis and the PPBS;
* application of computer technology;
* elimination of obsolescent military posts and facilities; and
* introduction of a flexible strategy, which among other things improved U.S. capacity to wage conventional and limited wars.
On the other hand, one journalist criticized McNamara as a "'human IBM machine' who cares more for computerized statistical logic than for human judgements." Sarcastic nicknames created by enemies include "
Mac the Knife," "arrogant dictator" or "an IBM machine with legs." His failure to accept responsiblity for his own actions, lack of commentary or explanation about the decision process that led to the Vietnam war, lack of the above involving its failure, and change in opinion regarding the war makes some critics infuriated; they think his opinion change was calculated. Critics say that few can deny that he was the architect of the war in Vietnam and that he left his post discredited.
Also McNamara was disliked by many military officers for his micromanagement, businesslike handling (reminiscent of his days in Ford) such as the body count and attrition warfare strategies, and purposeful ignoring of their opinions in the Vietnam War. To them, he was a capable administrator that over-reached into the planning of military operations, and was accordingly blamed for many of the strategic failures of the Vietnam War.
A list of failures made by critics includes:
* A failed attempt at weapons consolidation which created the unsuccessful
F-111 for two services; however the trend in fighter design has continued toward consolidation.
* A nuclear missile arms race with the Soviet Union despite his policy of Mutually Assured Destruction.
* An over-emphasis on strategic weapons over conventional weapons.
* A refusal to listen to the military leadership on strategy questions in Vietnam such as its changing nature.
* An attempt to construct a wall along the northern border of South Vietnam.
* The development of the plan to win by attrition in Vietnam.
* Ignoring the need for a heavy bomber in non-nuclear roles.
Although McNamara had many differences with military leaders and members of Congress, few could deny that he had a powerful impact on the Defense Department, and that much of what he had done would be a lasting legacy.
McNamara served as head of the
World Bank from April
1968 to June
1981, when he turned 65. In his thirteen years at the Bank, he introduced key changes. He negotiated with the conflicting countries represented in the Board a spectacular growth in funds to channel credits basically to development, in the form of health, food, and education projects. He also instituted better methods of evaluating the effectiveness of projects funded.
His term was seen as controversial by some as his policies led to what was called the third world debt crisis years later.
The World Bank currently has a
scholarship program under his name.
|
Robert McNamara in a 2003 interview |
In
1982 McNamara joined several other former national security officials in urging that the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in
Europe in the event of hostilities; subsequently he proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of NATO's defense posture. His memoir,
In Retrospect, published in
1995, presented an account and analysis of the
Vietnam War from his point of view. Reviews were very mixed. In particular, the book was viewed as McNamara's attempt to apologize for his role in the war, it has been seen as shifting blame to other people and as an attempt to transform his image from an architect of the war into a virtual opponent. Also, Noam Chomsky points out that McNamara in his memoir does not appear to be "sorry" for the Vietnam War itself, but rather to be "sorry" because it has been a waste of resources for the USA, without a clear gain. He quotes McNamara himself from his memoir
In Retrospect:
"We of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who participated in the decisions on Vietnam acted according to what we thought were the principles and traditions of this nation. We made our decisions in light of those values. Yet we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why. I truly believe that we made an error not of values and intentions, but of judgment and capabilities.". In other words, points Noam Chomsky, according to McNamara the "principles" and "values" for attacking Vietnam were right, only the calculations were wrong.
A picture of McNamara's 1995 meeting with General
Vo Nguyen Giap hangs in the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, near pictures of
John Kerry,
Elmo Zumwalt,
Warren Christopher, and other American dignitaries who visited Vietnam after normalization of relations between the two countries. [
1] [
2] (see photo #10 (Giap incorrectly identified as Mao))
During their 1995 meeting, Gen. Giap asked McNamara, how a country so rich could not afford history books, because Vietnam had no intention of becoming a Chinese puppet, evidence being the epic 1000 year war between China and Vietnam for independence. (paraphrased from McNamara in
The Fog of War)
McNamara has maintained his involvement in politics during recent years, delivering statements critical of the
Bush administration's
2003 invasion of Iraq. [
3] In the 1980s, he was highly critical of the defense and
Cold War policies of the
Reagan Administration.
On
January 5,
2006, McNamara and most living former Secretaries of Defence and
Secretaries of State met briefly at the White House with President Bush, to discuss the War in Iraq.
The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara is a
2003 Errol Morris documentary consisting mostly of interviews with Robert McNamara and archival footage. It received an
Academy Award for Documentary Feature. The particular structure of this personal account, is accomplished with the characteristics of an intimate dialoge, as McNamara explains, it is an honest process of hindsight upon the experiences of his long and controversial period as the
United States Secretary of Defense, as well as other periods of his personal and public life.
McNamara married Margaret Craig, his teenage sweetheart, in
1940. The couple had two daughters and a son.
Margaret McNamara, a former teacher, used her position as a Cabinet spouse to launch a reading program for young children,
Reading Is Fundamental, which became the largest literacy program in the country. She died in
1981, of cancer.
After his wife's death, McNamara dated
Katharine Graham, with whom he had been friends since the early 1960s. According to Graham's autobiography, she and McNamara had planned to be traveling in California with two other friends (a married couple) on her 70th birthday, in 1987, so she could avoid any birthday celebration in Washington. Graham died in 2001.
In September 2004, McNamara wed Diana Masieri Byfield, an Italian-born widow who had lived in the United States for more than 40 years. It was also her second marriage.[
4]
*
F-111 TFX fighter
* (1968)
The essence of security: reflections in office. New York, Harper & Row, 1968; London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1968. ISBN 0340109505.
* (1973)
One hundred countries, two billion people: the dimensions of development. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.
* (1981)
The McNamara years at the World Bank: major policy addresses of Robert S. McNamara, 1968-1981; with forewords by Helmut Schmidt and LĂ©opold Senghor. Baltimore: Published for the World Bank by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. ISBN 0801826853.
* (1985)
The challenges for sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: 1985.
* (1986)
Blundering into disaster: surviving the first century of the nuclear age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. ISBN 0394558502 (hardcover); ISBN 0394749871 (pbk.).
* (1989)
Out of the cold: new thinking for American foreign and defense policy in the 21st century. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. ISBN 0671689835.
* (1992)
The changing nature of global security and its impact on South Asia. Washington, DC: Washington Council on Non-Proliferation, 1992.
* (1995)
In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. (with Brian VanDeMark.) New York: Times Books, 1995. ISBN 0812925238; New York: Vintage Books, 1996. ISBN 0679767495.
* (1999)
Argument without end: in search of answers to the Vietnam tragedy. (Robert S. McNamara, James G. Blight, and Robert K. Brigham.) New York: Public Affairs, 1999. ISBN 1891620223 (hc).
* (2001)
Wilson's ghost: reducing the risk of conflict, killing, and catastrophe in the 21st century. (Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight.) New York: Public Affairs, 2001. ISBN 1891620894.
*
Biography of Robert Strange McNamara (website)*
US Department of Defense*
'Fog of War' - complete video*
McNamara quotes in The Fog of War by
wikiquote*
Noam Chomsky on Robert McNamara*
Robert McNamara's campaign contributions*
Annotated bibliography for Robert McNamara from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues{{Persondata
NAME=McNamara, Robert Strange | SHORT DESCRIPTION=United States Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War | DATE OF BIRTH=June 19, 1916 | PLACE OF BIRTH=San Francisco, California
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