Strategic Defense Initiative
The
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called
Star Wars after the popular
science fiction movies of the time, was proposed by U.S. President
Ronald Reagan on
March 23,
1983[Federation of American Scientists. Missile Defense Milestones. Accessed March 10, 2006.] to use ground-based and space-based systems to protect the
United States from attack by strategic
nuclear ballistic missiles. The initiative focused on strategic defense rather than the previous strategic offense doctrine of
Mutual assured destruction (MAD). Though it was never fully developed or deployed, the research and technologies of SDI paved the way for some
Anti-ballistic missile systems of today. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was set up in
1984 within the
United States Department of Defense to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Under the administration of President
Bill Clinton in
1993, its name was changed to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and its emphasis was shifted from national missile defense to theater missile defense, i.e. from global to regional coverage. This article covers defense efforts under the SDIO.
SDI was not the first U.S. defensive system against nuclear ballistic missiles. In the 1960s, the
The Sentinel Program was designed and developed to provide a limited defensive capability, but was never deployed. Sentinel technology was later used in the
Safeguard Program, briefly deployed to defend a single U.S. location. In the 1970s the Soviet Union deployed a missile defense system, still operational today, which defends Moscow and nearby missile sites.
SDI is unique from the earlier U.S. and Soviet missile defense efforts. It envisioned using space-oriented basing of defensive systems vs solely ground-launched interceptors. It also initially had the ambitious goal of a near total defense against a massive sophisticated
ICBM attack, vs previous systems which were limited in defensive capacity and geographic coverage, and oriented toward a lighter attack.
In the fall of 1979, at Reagan's request, Lieutenant General
Daniel O. Graham conceived a concept he called the High Frontier, a concept of strategic defense using ground and space based weapons theoretically possible because of emerging technologies. It was designed to replace the doctrine of Mutual assured destruction, a doctrine that Reagan and his aids described as a suicide-pact.
[Daniel O. Graham. Confessions of a Cold Warrior. October 1995. ISBN 0964449528.]The initial focus of the strategic defense initiative was a
nuclear explosion powered
X-ray laser designed at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a scientist named Peter Hagelstein who worked with a team called
O Group, doing much of the work in the late 1970s and early 1980s. O Group was headed by physicist Lowell Wood, a protégé and friend of
Edward Teller, the
"father of the hydrogen bomb".
Ronald Reagan was told of Hagelstein's breakthrough by Teller in 1983, which prompted Reagan's
March 23,
1983, "Star Wars" speech. Reagan announced, "I call upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." This speech, along with Reagan's
Evil Empire speech on
March 8,
1983, in Florida, ushered in the last phase of the
Cold War, bringing the nuclear standoff with the
Soviet Union to its most critical point before the collapse of the Soviet Union later that decade.
The concept for the space-based portion was to use lasers to shoot down incoming
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) armed with
nuclear warheads. Nobel Prize-winning physicist
Hans Bethe went to Livermore in February of 1983 for a 2 day briefing on the x-ray laser, and "Although impressed with its scientific novelty, Bethe went away highly skeptical it would contribute anything to the nation's defense."
[ p127.] |
Reagan delivering the March 23, 1983 speech initiating SDI. |
In 1984, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was established to oversee the program, which was headed by Lt. General James Alan Abrahamson, USAF, a past Director of the NASA
Space Shuttle program.
[Federation of American Scientists. Missile Defense Milestones. Accessed March 10, 2006.] Research and development initiated by the SDIO created significant technological advances in computer systems, component miniaturization, sensors and missile systems that form the basis for current systems.
Initially, the program focused on large scale systems designed to defeat a Soviet offensive strike. However, as the threat diminished, the program shifted towards smaller systems designed to defeat limited or accidental launches.
By 1987, the SDIO developed a national missile defense concept called the Strategic Defense System Phase I Architecture. This concept consisted of ground and space based sensors and weapons, as well as a central battle management system.
[Missile Defense Agency. History of the Missile Defense Organization. Accessed March 10, 2006.] The
ground-based systems operational today trace their roots back to this concept.
In his 1991
State of the Union Address George H. W. Bush shifted the focus of SDI from defense of North America against large scale strikes to a system focusing on theater missile defense called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Limited Ballistic Missile Strikes. Accessed April 27, 2006.]In 1993, the
Clinton administration, further shifted the focus to ground-based interceptor missiles and theater scale systems, forming the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and closing the SDIO. Ballistic missile defense has been revived by the
George W. Bush administration as the
National Missile Defense and Ground-based Midcourse Defense.
|
Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) launch from White Sands Missile Range. |
Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT)
The ERINT program was part of SDI's Theater Missile Defense Program and was an extension of the Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE), which included developing hit-to-kill technology and demonstrating the guidance accuracy of a small, agile, radar-homing vehicle.
FLAGE scored a direct hit against a
MGM-52 Lance missile in flight, at
White Sands Missile Range in 1987. ERINT was a prototype missile similar to the FLAGE, but it used a new solid-propellant rocket motor allowing it to fly faster and higher than FLAGE.
Under BMDO, ERINT was later chosen as the
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile.
[White Sands Missile Range. ERINT -- Extended Range Interceptor. Accessed March 10, 2006.]Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)
|
4 m (13 ft) diameter web deployed by Homing Overlay Experiment |
It was the first system tested by the Army that employed hit-to-kill, four test launches were conducted in 1983 and 1984. The first three tests failed because of guidance and sensor problems, but the fourth test succeeded. This technology was later used by the SDIO and expanded into the Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS) program.
[Encyclopedia Astronautica. SVC / Lockheed HOE. Accessed March 10, 2006.]Exoatmospheric Reentry-vehicle Interception System (ERIS)
Developed by
Lockheed as part of the ground based interceptor portion of SDI beginning in 1985. At least two tests occurred in the early 1990s. This system was never deployed, but the technology of the system were used in the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and the Ground Based Interceptor currently deployed as part of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.
[Encyclopedia Astronautica. Lockheed ERIS. Accessed March 10, 2006.]X-ray laser
|
An artist's concept of a Space Laser Satellite Defense System, 1984. |
An early focus of the project was to be a curtain of X-ray lasers powered by nuclear explosions. The curtain was to be deployed, first by a series of missiles launched from submarines during the critical seconds following a Soviet attack, then later by satellites and powered by nuclear warheads built into the satellites - in theory the energy from the warhead detonation was to pump a series of laser emitters in the missiles or satellites and produce an impenetrable barrier to incoming warheads. However, the first test on
March 26,
1983,
[United States Department of Energy. United States Nuclear Tests 1945-1992. Accessed March 10, 2006.], known as the
Cabra event, which was performed in an underground shaft, resulted in marginally positive readings that could be dismissed as a faulty detector. Since a nuclear explosion was the power source, the detector was destroyed during the experiment and the results could not be confirmed. Critics often cite the X-ray laser system as the primary focus of SDI and its apparent failure becomes a main reason to oppose SDI. However, the laser was never more than one of the many systems being researched for ballistic missile defense.
Despite the apparent failure of the Cabra test, the long term legacy of the X-ray laser program is the knowledge gained while conducting the research. Several spin-offs include a laboratory x-ray laser for biological imaging and creation of 3D holograms of living organisms, creation of advanced materials like
SEAgel and
Aerogel, the Electron-Beam Ion Trap facility for physics research and enhanced techniques for early detection of breast cancer.
[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Legacy of the X-Ray Laser Program (PDF). November 1994. Accessed April 29, 2006.]Chemical laser
|
SeaLite Beam Director, commonly used as the output for the MIRACL. |
Beginning in 1985, the Air Force tested a
deuterium fluoride laser known as
Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) at
White Sands Missile Range funded by the SDIO. During a simulation, the laser successfully destroyed a Titan missile booster in 1985 and it was successfully tested on target drones simulating cruise missiles for the US Navy. After the SDIO closed, the MIRACL was unsuccessfully tested on an old Air Force Satellite for potential use as an
Anti-satellite weapon. The technology was also used to develop the
Tactical High Energy Laser(THEL) which is being tested to shoot down artillery shells.
[Federation of American Scientists. Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser. Accessed April 8, 2006.]Neutral Particle Beam
In July 1989, the Beam Experiments Aboard a Rocket (BEAR) program launched a sounding rocket containing a neutral
particle beam (NPB) accelerator. The experiment successfully demonstrated that a particle beam would operate and propagate as predicted outside the atmosphere and that there are no unexpected side-effects to firing the beam in space. After the rocket was recovered, the particle beam was still operational.
[Nunz, G. J.; Los Alamos National Laboratory. BEAR (Beam Experiments Aboard a Rocket) Project. Volume 1: Project Summary. Accessed April 29, 2006.] According to the BMDO, the research on neutral particle beam accelerators, which was originally funded by the SDIO, could eventually be used to reduce the half life of nuclear waste products using
accelerator-driven transmutation technology.
[Missile Defense Agency. BMDO funded research may help reduce the impact of nuclear waste (PDF). Accessed April 29, 2006.]Laser and mirror experiments
|
Technicians at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), work on the Low-powered Atmosphere Compensation Experiment (LACE) satellite. |
The High Precision Tracking Experiment (HPTE), launched with the
Space Shuttle Discovery on
STS-51-G, was tested
June 21,
1985 when a Hawaii-based low-power laser successfully tracked the experiment and bounced the laser off of the HPTE mirror.
The Relay mirror experiment (RME), launched in February 1990, demonstrated critical technologies for space-based relay mirrors to be used with an SDI
Directed-energy weapon system. The experiment validated stabilization, tracking and pointing concepts and proved that a laser could be relayed from the ground to a 60 cm mirror on an orbiting satellite and back to another ground station with a high degree of accuracy and for extended durations.
[Lieutenant General Malcolm R. O'Neill. Statement of Lieutenant General Malcolm R. O'Neill, USA, Director, BMDO before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, April 4, 1995. Accessed March 11, 2006.] Launched on the same rocket as the RME, the Low-power Atmospheric Compensation Experiment (LACE) satellite was built by the
United States Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to explore atmospheric distortion of lasers and real-time adaptive compensation for that distortion. The LACE satellite also included several other experiments to help develop and improve SDI sensors, including target discrimination using background radiation and tracking ballistic missiles using Ultra-Violet Plume Imaging (UVPI).
[Encyclopedia Astronautica. Low-power Atmospheric Compensation Experiment (LACE). Accessed April 29, 2006.] LACE was also used to evaluate ground based
adaptive optics, a technique now used in civilian telescopes to remove atmospheric distortions.
Space-Based Interceptor (SBI)
Groups of interceptors were to be housed in orbital modules. Successful hover testing was completed in 1988 and demonstrated successful integration of the sensor and propulsion systems in the prototype SBI. It also demonstrated the ability of the seeker to shift its aim-point from a rocket's hot plume to its cool body, a first for infrared ABM seekers. Final hover testing occurred in 1992 using miniaturized components similar to what would have actually been used in an operational interceptor. These prototypes eventually evolved into the Brilliant Pebbles program.
[Federation of American Scientists. Ballistic Missile Defense. Accessed March 10, 2006.]Brilliant Pebbles
|
Brilliant Pebbles concept artwork. |
Brilliant Pebbles was a non-nuclear system of satellite-based, watermelon-sized,
[Claremont Institute. Brilliant Pebbles. Accessed March 11, 2006.] mini-missiles designed to use a high-velocity
kinetic warhead.
[The Heritage Foundation. Brilliant Pebbles. Accessed March 11, 2006.] It was designed to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Eyes sensor system and would have detected and destroyed missiles without any external guidance.
John H. Nuckolls, director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 1988 to 1994, described the system as "The crowning achievement of the Strategic Defense Initiative". The technologies developed for SDI were used in numerous later projects. For example, the sensors and cameras that were developed for Brilliant Pebbles became components of the
Clementine mission and SDI technologies may also have a role in future missile defense efforts.
[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Summary of Brilliant Pebbles.Accessed March 11, 2006.]Though regarded as one of the most capable SDI systems, the Brilliant Pebbles program was canceled in 1994 by the BMDO.
[Federation of American Scientists. Ballistic Missile Defense Technology: Is the United States Ready for A Decision to Deploy?. Accessed March 11, 2006.] However, it is being reevaluated for possible future use by the MDA.
|
Delta 183 launch vehicle lifts off, carrying the SDI sensor experiment, "Delta Star", March 24, 1989. |
SDIO sensor research encompassed visible light, ultra-violet, infrared and RADAR technologies, and eventually led to the Clementine mission though that mission occurred just after the program transitioned to the BMDO. Like other parts of SDI the sensor system initially was very large scale, but after the Soviet threat diminished it was scaled down.
Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS)
BSTS was part of the SDIO in the late-80's, and was designed to assist detection of missile launches especially during the boost phase. However, once the SDI program shifted toward theater missile defense, the system left SDIO control in the early 90's and was transferred to the Air Force.
[Federation of American Scientists. Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS). Accessed March 10, 2006.]Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS)
SSTS was a system originally designed for tracking ballistic missiles during their mid-course phase. It was designed to work in conjunction with BSTS, but was later scaled down for the Brilliant Eyes program.
[Federation of American Scientists. Ballistic Missile Defense. Accessed March 10, 2006.]Brilliant Eyes
Brilliant Eyes was a simpler derivative of the Space Surveillance and Tracking System (SSTS) that focused on theater ballistic missiles rather than ICBMs and was meant to operate in conjunction with the Brilliant Pebbles system.
Brilliant Eyes was renamed Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS) and scaled back further under BMDO, and in the late 1990s it became the low earth orbit component of the Air Force's Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
[Federation of American Scientists. Space and Missile Tracking System. Accessed March 11, 2006.]Other Sensor Experiments
The Delta 183 program used a satellite known as
Delta Star to test several sensor related technologies. Delta Star carried an infrared imager, a long-wave infrared imager, an ensemble of imagers and photometers covering several visible and ultraviolet bands as well as a laser detector and ranging device. The satellite observed several ballistic missile launches including some releasing liquid propellant as a countermeasure to detection. Data from the experiments led to advances in sensor technologies.
[The Aerospace Corporation. Delta Star: an SDIO Space Experiment. Accessed June 18, 2006.] |
An artist's concept of a ground / space-based hybrid laser weapon, 1984. |
In warfighting,
countermeasures can have two general meanings:
(1) The immediate tactical action to reduce vulnerability, such as
chaff,
decoys, and maneuvering.
(2) Counter strategies which exploit a weakness of an opposing system, such as adding more
MIRV warheads which are less expensive than the interceptors fired against them.
Countermeasures of various types have long been a key part of warfighting strategy. However with SDI they attained a special prominence due to the system cost, scenario of a massive sophisticated attack, strategic consequences of a less-than-perfect defense, outer-space basing of many proposed weapons systems, and political debate.
Whereas the current U.S.
NMD system is designed around a relatively limited unsophisticated attack, SDI planned for a massive attack by a sophisticated opponent. This raised significant issues about economic and technical costs defending against
anti-ballistic missile defense countermeasures used by the attacking side.
For example if it had been much cheaper to add attacking warheads than to add defenses, an attacker of similar economic power could have simply out produced the defender. This requirement of being "cost effective at the margin" was first formulated by
Paul Nitze in November, 1985.
[Marilyn Berger. Paul Nitze, Cold War Arms Expert, Dies at 97.(PDF) New York Times. October 20, 2004.]A sophisticated attacker having the technology to use decoys, shielding, maneuvering warheads, or other countermeasures would have multiplied the difficulty and cost of intercepting the real warheads.
SDI envisioned many space-based systems in fixed orbits. In theory an advanced opponent could have targeted those, in turn requiring self-defense capability or increased numbers to compensate for attrition. SDI design and operational planning had to factor in all these countermeasures and the associated cost.
$44 billion was appropriated by Congress for SDI from 1983 to 1993. This may not include SDI research funded by the Department of Energy.
[ Joseph Cirincione. A Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defense. July 2, 1998.] |
SDI wasn't just lasers, in this Kinetic Energy Weapon test, a seven gram Lexan projectile was fired from a light gas gun at a velocity of 23,000 feet per second at this cast aluminum block. |
SDI is believed to have been first dubbed "Star Wars" by opponent
Dr. Carol Rosin, a consultant and former spokesperson for
Wernher von Braun. Some critics used that term derisively, implying it is an impractical
science fiction fantasy, but supporters have adopted the usage as well on the grounds that yesterday's science fiction is often tomorrow's engineering. In comments to the media
March 7,
1986, Acting Deputy Director of SDIO, Dr. Gerold Yonas, described the name "Star Wars" as an important tool for Soviet disinformation and asserted that the nickname gave an entirely wrong impression of SDI.
[Dr. Gerold Yonas. SDI:Prospects and Challenges. March 7, 1986.]Ashton Carter, a fellow at
MIT, assessed SDI for Congress in 1984. He said there were a number of difficulties in creating an adequate missile defense shield, with or without lasers. He said X-rays have a limited scope because they become diffused through the atmosphere, much like the beam of a flash light spreading outward in all directions. This means the X-rays needed to be close to the Soviet Union, especially during the critical few minutes of the booster phase, in order for the Soviet missiles to be both detectable to radar and targeted by the lasers themselves. Opponents disagreed, saying advances in technology, such as using very strong laser beams, and by "bleaching" the column of air surrounding the laser beam, could increase the distance that the X-ray would reach to successfully hit its target. Physicist
Hans Bethe, who worked with Teller on both the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, both at
Los Alamos, claimed a laser defense shield was unfeasible. He said that a defensive system was costly and difficult to build, but simple to destroy, and claimed that the Soviets could easily use thousands of decoys to overwhelm it during a nuclear attack. He believed that the only way to stop the threat of nuclear war was through diplomacy and dismissed the idea of a
technical solution to the Cold War, saying that a defense shield could be viewed as threatening because it would limit or destroy Soviet offensive capabilities while leaving the American offense intact. In March 1984, Bethe coauthored a 106-page report for the
Union of Concerned Scientists that concluded "the X-ray laser offers no prospect of being a useful component in a system for ballistic missile defense."
[Union of Concerned Scientists. Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Cambridge, MA. March 1984.]Teller countered that Bethe and the other anti-defense activists could not have it both ways. Teller said Bethe had helped him usher in the nuclear age, had become opposed to nuclear weapons and afraid of nuclear war. But, Bethe was also opposed to stopping the threat of offensive capabilities through massive defensive programs. Teller testified before Congress that Bethe, "instead of objecting on scientific and technical grounds, which he thoroughly understands, he now objects on the grounds of politics, on grounds of military feasibility of military deployment, on other grounds of difficult issues which are quite outside the range of his professional cognizance or mine."
Supporters of SDI hail it for contributing to or at least accelerating the fall of the Soviet Union by the
strategy of technology, which was a prevalent doctrine at the time. At Reagan and Gorbachev's October 1986 meeting in Iceland, Gorbachev opposed this defensive shield, while Reagan wanted to keep it, and offered to give the technology to the Soviets. Gorbachev said he didn't believe the offer, saying "Excuse me, Mr. President, but I do not take your idea of sharing SDI seriously. You don't want to share even petroleum equipment, automatic machine tools or equipment for dairies, while sharing SDI would be a second American Revolution." Both Reagan and Gorbachev proposed total elimination of all nuclear-armed missiles, but SDI and intermediate-range missiles were sticking points.
[CNN. Reagan-Gorbachev Transcripts. Accessed March 25, 2006.] While SDI was a disagreement, the
Reykjavik Summit led to the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which some have claimed was an outgrowth of Gorbachev's fear of SDI. Opponents of the program say that
Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms were the cause of the USSR's collapse and that SDI was an unrealistic and expensive program. Furthermore, some believed that Gorbachev's opposition to SDI was intended to encourage the United States to pursue ABM defense at great economic expense. To quote Gorbachev, "But I think that I am even helping the president [Reagan] with SDI. After all, your people say that if Gorbachev attacks SDI and space weapons so much, it means the idea deserves more respect. They even say that if it were not for me, no one would listen to the idea at all. And some even claim that I want to drag the United States into unnecessary expenditures with this."
[CNN. Reagan-Gorbachev Transcripts. Accessed March 25, 2006.]There was also the question of how to test this massive weapons system under conditions resembling nuclear war.
[ Joseph Cirincione. A Brief History of Ballistic Missile Defense. July 2, 1998.]Treaty Obligations
Another criticism of SDI was that it would require the United States to modify, withdraw from, or violate previously ratified treaties. The
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which requires "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" would forbid the US from pre-positioning in earth orbit any devices powered by nuclear weapons, or any devices capable of "mass destruction". Only the nuclear pumped X-ray laser would have violated this treaty since other SDI systems would not utilize nuclear weapons. The
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its subsequent protocol
[Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. May 24, 1976.], which limited missile defenses to one location per country at 100 missiles each, would have been violated by SDI ground-based interceptors. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Many viewed favoring deployment of ABM systems as an escalation rather than cessation of the nuclear arms race, and therefore a violation of this clause.
SDI and MAD
SDI was criticized for potentially disrupting the strategic doctrine of
Mutual Assured Destruction. MAD postulated that intentional nuclear attack was inhibited by the certain ensuing mutual self-destruction. Even if a nuclear first strike destroyed many of the opponent's weapons, sufficient nuclear missiles would survive to render a devastating counter-strike at the attacker. The criticism was that SDI could have potentially allowed an attacker to survive the lighter counter-strike, thus encouraging a first strike by the side having SDI. Another destabilizing scenario was countries being tempted to strike first before SDI was deployed, thereby avoiding a disadvantaged nuclear posture.
Ronald Reagan responded that SDI would be given to the Soviet Union to prevent the imbalance from occurring.
[CNN. Reagan-Gorbachev Transcripts. Accessed March 25, 2006.] How and whether this massive technology transfer would have happened was often debated. A complication of the MAD argument was that MAD only covered intentional nuclear attacks by a rational opponent with similar values, not accidental launches, rogue launches, or launches by non-state entities.
Non-ICBM Delivery
Another criticism of SDI was that it would not be effective against non-space faring weapons, namely
cruise missiles,
bombers, and non-conventional delivery methods such as delivery via a commercial naval vessels. This latter method in particular would be attractive to terrorists and rogue states as it would be inexpensive, difficult to trace, and technologically undemanding.
Note: Click Hide
twice to show the timeline
Because of public awareness of the program and its controversial nature, SDI has been the subject of many fictional and pop culture references. This is not intended to be a complete list of those references.
In novels:
*
Dale Brown's novel
Silver Tower details the adventures on and around a space station that employs an anti-ICBM laser system called Skybolt against a Soviet invasion of Iran.
*
Tom Clancy's novel
The Cardinal of the Kremlin is based on part of a race between the USA and USSR to complete laser-based SDI systems.
*
Homer Hickam Jr's novel
Back to the Moon used leftover SDI weapons, similar to Brilliant Pebbles, in an attempt to kill the crew of shuttle
Columbia.
In computer games:
* In the
Civilization series, there are several references to ICBM defense systems similar to SDI.
* In
Rise of Nations, there is a technology called the Missile Shield.
* In
Star Control, outdated, surplus SDI weapons are common secondary weapons on Earth starships.
In motion pictures:
*
RoboCop, a brief satirical news story mentions how the Ronald Reagan memorial Strategic Defense platform in orbit malfunctioned, destroying a swath of Southern California in the process.
*
Spies Like Us follows two duped 'spies' who are told to launch a single Soviet missile towards the USA as part of a black ops operation to demonstrate and justify the expense of SDI.
In music:
*"Star Wars Won't Work" was a song from the 1991
Frank Zappa album
Make a Jazz Noise Here.
*
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)
*
National Missile Defense (NMD)
*
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
*
Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
*
Anti-satellite weapons
*
Anti-ballistic missile*
Militarization of spaceReferences
*
* (Reprint edition 1993; Diane Pub. Co.)
External links
* Enenstein,
"US3427611", Feb., 1969 (Laser System)
*
Missile Wars - A
PBS Frontline report.
*
The Militarization of Science and Space - Commentary and analysis by NMD critic
Noam Chomsky.
*
Short History of SDI History of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), including the role of
Total Quality Management (TQM) in its development
*
Nuclear Files.org Ronald Reagan on the Strategic Defense Initiative
*
Buggy Software and Missile Defense - Mark Halpern,
The New Atlantis*
Historical budgetary information